Stress is often portrayed as harmful, yet moderate, acute stress can enhance learning, memory retention, and social bonding. Recent epigenetic research reveals that stress hormones modulate gene expression in key brain regions, strengthening memory consolidation and attentional processes. Unpleasant or intense experiences tend to form long-lasting memories, an adaptive mechanism for survival. Beyond cognition, stress can facilitate social bonding through oxytocin-mediated social buffering, as demonstrated in mammals, including domesticated dogs, although effects are highly context-dependent. Excessive or chronic stress, however, disrupts these processes, impairing memory, social interactions, and overall well-being. This paper emphasizes the nuanced, dual role of stress, highlighting its adaptive functions and underscoring the importance of understanding stress within an evolutionary and behavioral framework, not least because such understanding can inform more efficient animal behavior modification.
Stress Helps Learning and Bonding
A tough nut to crack is an everlasting memory that binds the parties together, and there is a reason for that. Moderate stress heightens arousal and sharpens attention, facilitating learning and the formation of durable memories (Roozendaal, McEwen, & Chattarji, 2009; McGaugh, 2015). Studies show that stress-related hormones and neuromodulators can also strengthen certain social bonds, depending on context, species, and prior history (Carter, 2014; Hostinar, Sullivan, & Gunnar, 2014).
Fig. 1 — Illustration of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis during the stress response: the hypothalamus detects stress and releases corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH), which stimulates the pituitary gland to release adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH). ACTH triggers the adrenal glands to produce cortisol, the body’s key stress hormone. Cortisol’s effects on the body feed back to regulate this system, maintaining balance through a negative feedback loop.
The Term Stress Is Dangerously Ambiguous
We need to be careful, though. The term stress is dangerously ambiguous. Richard Shweder once described stress in a 1997 New York Times, Week in Review essay, as “a word that is as useful as a Visa card and as satisfying as a Coke. It’s non-committal and also non-committable.” Here, we adopt a biological definition:
Stress is the organism’s coordinated physiological response to a real or perceived challenge to homeostasis, involving the activation of the sympathetic nervous system and the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis to restore equilibrium (see fig. 1).
This distinction—between colloquial and biological uses—is crucial because the physiological and behavioral mechanisms engaged differ depending on whether the stressor is acute or chronic, controllable or uncontrollable. In this context, Koolhaas et al. (2011, p. 1291) propose that “the term ‘stress’ should be restricted to conditions where an environmental demand exceeds the natural regulatory capacity of an organism, in particular situations that include unpredictability and uncontrollability,” emphasizing the adaptive and context-dependent nature of the stress response (McEwen & Wingfield, 2010; Koolhaas et al., 2011).
What Is the Function of Stress?
Being an evolutionary biologist, when contemplating a mechanism, I always ask: “What is the function of that? What is that good for?” A mechanism can originate by chance (most do), but unless it provides the individual with some extra benefits in survival and reproduction, it will not spread in the population. From an evolutionary perspective, the stress response and the modulation of memory under stress increase the probability of survival (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009; McEwen, Nasca, & Gray, 2016).
Why Do Unpleasant Memories Persist?
Emotionally intense, threatening, or highly arousing situations produce stronger, more persistent memory traces. Biologically, remembering potentially harmful events helps self-preservation. Negative or threatening events recruit the amygdala–hippocampal network more strongly, with the amygdala modulating hippocampal consolidation via noradrenergic and glucocorticoid-dependent mechanisms (Johansen, Cain, Ostroff, & LeDoux, 2011; McGaugh, 2015; LeDoux & Pine, 2016).
Fig. 2 — Sequence of events from exposure to a stressor through activation of the body’s physiological and behavioral stress response system (including the HPA axis), resulting in molecular and epigenetic changes such as DNA methylation and altered gene expression in stress-related genes. These epigenetic modifications influence future stress responsiveness and can affect health outcomes over the long term.
Epigenetic Effects
One of the most exciting scientific discoveries of late is the role of epigenetics (see fig. 2). Epigenetics—the study of modifications in gene activity that occur without altering the DNA sequence—has become central to contemporary models of learning and memory. Bird defines an epigenetic event as “the structural adaptation of chromosomal regions so as to register, signal or perpetuate altered activity states” (Bird, 2007, p. 398). Within this framework, attention focuses on activity-dependent chromatin modifications that occur during an individual’s lifetime rather than on transgenerational inheritance (Allis & Jenuwein, 2016). Mechanisms such as DNA methylation, histone acetylation, and related chromatin adjustments fine-tune gene expression in response to salient experiences, enabling the formation and stabilization of memory (Sweatt, 2013). Stress hormones act on mineralocorticoid and glucocorticoid receptors in hippocampal and amygdalar circuits, where they modulate plasticity and enhance the consolidation of significant events (Roozendaal, McEwen, & Chattarji, 2009; McEwen et al., 2012). Through interactions with noradrenergic projections from the locus coeruleus, glucocorticoids further shape these epigenetic regulators, influencing transcriptional programs essential for synaptic plasticity (Zovkic, Guzman-Karlsson, & Sweatt, 2013; Gray, Rubin, Hunter, & McEwen, 2014). These coordinated molecular processes, under moderate stress, enhance learning and contribute to the durability of highly arousing or threatening experiences.
Not All Stress Boosts Learning
Not all stress is productive for learning. Excessive stress produces the opposite effect. There is a difference between being stressed and stressed out. When stress becomes excessive or prolonged, the organism enters a state where immediate survival takes priority over other functions, and memory formation decreases. Chronic stress, in particular, undermines learning and cognitive function by disrupting hippocampal structure and impairing synaptic plasticity (de Kloet, Joëls, & Holsboer, 2005). These maladaptive effects highlight that stress is beneficial only within a moderate and context-dependent range; beyond that, it impairs both cognition and emotional regulation.
Stress and Bonding—A Delicate Balance
Stress does more than enhance memory; under certain conditions, it actively promotes social bonding. Oxytocin, a neuropeptide closely linked to affiliation, mediates this effect by dampening the HPA axis response during shared or moderate stress, thereby encouraging proximity and affiliative behaviors (Crockford, Deschner, & Wittig, 2017). In rodents, moderate stress enhances social-seeking behavior among cagemates via oxytocin signaling, though excessively threatening contexts abolish this effect (Burkett et al., 2015). Findings in rodents provide a foundation for understanding oxytocin-mediated bonding, which can also be observed in humans and domesticated dogs, albeit with species-specific nuances.
In domesticated dogs, exogenous oxytocin increases sociability toward humans and conspecifics, and social interactions raise endogenous oxytocin levels (Nagasawa et al., 2015). Just as humans bond emotionally through mutual gaze—a process mediated by oxytocin—Nagasawa et al. demonstrate that a similar gaze-mediated bonding exists between humans and dogs: “These findings support the existence of an interspecies oxytocin-mediated positive loop facilitated and modulated by gazing, which may have supported the coevolution of human-dog bonding by engaging common modes of communicating social attachment” (Nagasawa et al., 2015, p. 333). Longitudinal observations further show that chronic stress markers, such as hair cortisol, can synchronize between dogs and their owners, suggesting a deep physiological linkage (Sundman et al., 2020). Importantly, these bonding effects are highly context-dependent: moderate, predictable stress tends to facilitate affiliation, whereas excessive or prolonged stress may inhibit social bonding.
Caveats: Despite the fascinating discoveries mentioned above, we must be prudent in our conclusions. The effects of stress on bonding are highly context-dependent. Elevated cortisol in dogs can reflect excitement rather than distress (Nagasawa et al., 2015), and the benefits observed in rodents require non-threatening environments (Burkett et al., 2015). Oxytocin’s influence varies with social familiarity; stress may not enhance affiliation with strangers or weakly bonded partners (Crockford et al., 2017). Correlational studies, such as cortisol synchronization in dog–owner dyads, cannot prove causality, though they suggest physiological coupling that may support bonding under shared stress.
Conclusion
We need a balanced view of stress. Acute, manageable challenges—those that elicit adaptive stress responses—support attentional sharpening, facilitate memory consolidation, strengthen social bonds, and promote effective learning. These benefits are highly context-dependent: stress can enhance cognition and affiliation when moderate and predictable, but excessive or prolonged stress can overwhelm these systems, impairing memory, social interactions, and overall well-being. From an evolutionary perspective, stress serves a dual adaptive function—preparing individuals to respond to threats while reinforcing social bonds that increase survival odds. A nuanced understanding is therefore essential for interpreting behavior and guiding sound practice.
For animal trainers, these insights translate into a few practical guidelines. Animals benefit from gradual exposure to manageable, stress-eliciting challenges that promote resilience and adaptive coping. Training sessions should be calibrated so that the stress elicited remains within a range that facilitates attention and learning—enough to trigger mild HPA-axis activation, but not so intense as to be counter-productive. Moreover, designing training sessions that employ an appropriate level of stress can strengthen the trainer–animal bond by allowing the trainer to serve as a social buffer during mildly stressful tasks.
Featured picture: A tough nut to crack is an everlasting memory that binds the parties together (photo by unknown).
References
Allis, C. D., & Jenuwein, T. (2016). The molecular hallmarks of epigenetic control. Nature Reviews Genetics, 17(8), 487–500. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg.2016.59
Burkett, J. P., Andari, E., Johnson, Z. V., Curry, D. C., de Waal, F. B. M., & Young, L. J. (2016). Oxytocin‑dependent consolation behavior in rodents. Science, 351(6271), 375–378. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aac4785
Crockford, C., Deschner, T., & Wittig, R. M. (2017). The role of oxytocin in social buffering of stress: What do primate studies add? Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences, 30, 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2017_12
de Kloet, E. R., Joëls, M., & Holsboer, F. (2005). Stress and the brain: From adaptation to disease. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6(6), 463–475. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1683
Gray, J. D., Rubin, T. G., Hunter, R. G., & McEwen, B. S. (2014). Hippocampal gene expression changes underlying stress sensitization and recovery. Molecular Psychiatry, 19(11), 1171–1178. https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2013.175
Hostinar, C. E., Sullivan, R. M., & Gunnar, M. R. (2014). Psychobiological mechanisms underlying the social buffering of the stress response: A review of animal models and human studies across development. Psychological Bulletin, 140(1), 256–282. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032671
Johansen, J. P., Cain, C. K., Ostroff, L. E., & LeDoux, J. E. (2011). Molecular mechanisms of fear learning and memory. Cell, 147(3), 509–524. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2011.10.009
Koolhaas, J. M., Bartolomucci, A., Buwalda, B., de Boer, S. F., Flügge, G., Korte, S. M., … Fuchs, E. (2011). Stress revisited: A critical evaluation of the stress concept. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(5), 1291–1301. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.02.003
LeDoux, J. E., & Pine, D. S. (2016). Using neuroscience to help understand fear and anxiety: A two-system framework. American Journal of Psychiatry, 173(11), 1083–1093. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2016.16030353
McEwen, B. S., Eiland, L., Hunter, R. G., & Miller, M. M. (2012). Stress and anxiety: Structural plasticity and epigenetic regulation as a consequence of stress.Neuropharmacology, 62(1), 3–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropharm.2011.07.014
McEwen, B. S., Nasca, C., & Gray, J. D. (2016). Stress effects on neuronal structure: Hippocampus, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex. Neuropsychopharmacology, 41(1), 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1038/npp.2015.171
McEwen, B. S., & Wingfield, J. C. (2010). What is in a name? Integrating homeostasis, allostasis, and stress. Hormones and Behavior, 57(2), 105–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yhbeh.2009.09.011
Nagasawa, M., Mitsui, S., En, S., Ohtani, N., Ohta, M., Sakuma, Y., … Kikusui, T. (2015). Oxytocin-gaze positive loop and the coevolution of human–dog bonds. Science, 348(6232), 333–336. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1261022
Nesse, R. M., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2009). Evolution, emotions, and emotional disorders. American Psychologist, 64(2), 129–139. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013503
Roozendaal, B., McEwen, B. S., & Chattarji, S. (2009). Stress, memory and the amygdala. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(6), 423–433. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2651
Sundman, A.-S., Van Poucke, E., Svensson Holm, A.-C., Faresjö, Å., Theodorsson, E., Jensen, P., & Roth, L. S. V. (2020). Long-term stress levels are synchronized in dogs and their owners.Scientific Reports, 10(1), 17112. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-74204-8
Zovkic, I. B., Guzman-Karlsson, M. C., & Sweatt, J. D. (2013). Epigenetic regulation of memory formation and maintenance. Learning & Memory, 20(2), 61–74. https://doi.org/10.1101/lm.026575.112
Dogs also exhibit the muzzle grasp behavior (photo by Marco de Kloet).
A “Muzzle grasp” (or muzzle grab) is a common behavior shown by social canines, e.g., wolves (Canis lupus lupus), dingoes (Canis lupus dingo), and dogs (Canis lupus familiaris). The primary function of this behavior is to confirm a relationship rather than to settle a dispute. The more self-confident or higher-ranking individual will muzzle-grasp a more insecure or lower-ranking partner to assert its social position. The more insecure individual does not resist the grasp; on the contrary, it often displays submissive behavior, literally inviting its partner to muzzle-grasp it. Even though we sometimes see this behavior at the end of a dispute, wolves and dogs only use it toward individuals they know well—pack members—as a kind of saying, “You’re still a cub (pup).” The dispute itself tends not to be serious, merely a low-key challenge, often over access to a resource. Youngsters, cubs, and pups sometimes solicit adults to muzzle-grasp them. This behavior appears reassuring to them.
The muzzle-grasp behavior emerges early in development. Canine mothers muzzle-grasp their puppies (sometimes accompanied by a growl) to deter them from suckling during weaning. Field observations confirm this mechanism. As Packard, Mech, and Ream (1992, p. 1274) report, “In the context of playing, begging, and sharing, pups did not leave when another wolf muzzled, snapped, or lunged. In contrast, the muzzling by the nurser in the context of suckling terminated the pups’ attempts to gain access to nipples.” This observation illustrates the early communicative value of the muzzle contact as both a mild inhibitory and relational signal. Cubs and pups also muzzle-grasp one another during play, typically between six and nine weeks of age. They probably learn through play that the muzzle-grasp is an effective way of stopping an opponent from doing something, while also learning bite inhibition. If they bite too hard, they elicit a fight and risk injury. A muzzle-grasp, therefore, does not involve biting, only grasping. This behavior helps develop a relationship of trust between both parties—“we don’t hurt one another.”
Similar tactile interactions, including muzzle-to-muzzle contact, also occur in post-conflict and affiliative contexts among wolves. Cordoni and Palagi (2019) describe reciprocal muzzle-licking between adults and immature pack members following mild conflicts—acts that function as “consolation” and reinforce social bonds. Although a muzzle-grasp differs mechanically from muzzle-licking, both share an underlying functional value: the restoration or affirmation of trust within a dyad. These tactile gestures exemplify the nuanced physical vocabulary through which canids maintain cohesion and mitigate tension within the pack.
Classic naturalist observations (Zimen, 1981) describe frequent muzzle-to-muzzle contacts and note adults seizing pups’ muzzles during play and weaning; together with quantitative field data (Packard, Mech, & Ream, 1992), this supports the view that muzzle contact is an early-emerging, ritualised tactile signal rather than an aggressive act.
When used to settle a dispute, a muzzle-grasp may appear more violent and usually ends with the individual being muzzle-grasped exhibiting passive, submissive behavior. Yet participants very seldom, if ever, get hurt, an occurrence that would undermine the behavior’s function.
Left: Cubs and pups muzzle grasp one another during play. Right: Muzzle grasp in adult wolves (photos by Monty Sloan).
A muzzle-grasp requires self-control. Higher-ranking wolves and dogs muzzle-grasp their pack members (teammates) and, by doing so, confirm their rank while displaying restraint. Lower-ranking wolves and dogs often engage in muzzle-grasping behavior to affirm their social position and reassure themselves that they remain included in the group.
The muzzle-grasp behavior probably originated as both a form of maternal (and later paternal) control and as a play behavior among cubs. As it appears to have been beneficial to all parties involved, it may have become a factor favored by natural selection, spreading from generation to generation and evolving as any other trait that enhances the fitness of individuals within cohesive social groups.
In domestic dogs, when puppies are about five to seven weeks old, their mother regularly muzzle-grasps them to deter suckling. At first, her behavior frightens them, and they may whimper excessively, even though she does not harm them. Later, when grasped by the muzzle, the puppy immediately shows passive submissive behavior—lying on its back and exposing its ventral side. Previously, it was assumed that the mother needed to pin the puppy to the ground; however, Packard et al. (1992) observed that, in wolves, in practice, “[…] on the occasions when the nurser winced or muzzled the pups, the pups did not persist” and that “[…] counter-tactics for overcoming nurser rejection did not occur (pp. 1271–1272).” Most puppies submit voluntarily. Over time, this behavior pattern assumes variations. Wolf cubs and puppies often invite the alpha male (the leader of the pack and, in wolves, usually their father) as well as other adults to grasp them by the muzzle, thereby soliciting a demonstration of their elders’ superiority and self-control while simultaneously showing their own acceptance and submissiveness. This is among the most reassuring behaviors an adult can show a youngster.
Domestic dogs sometimes approach their owners puffing gently with their noses. By gently placing a hand around their muzzle, we may reassure them of acceptance, demonstrate self-control, and convey that they can trust us. That is speaking dog-language to the best of our abilities. After being muzzle-grasped for a while, the dog will usually show a nose-lick, perhaps yawn, and then walk calmly away. It is as if the dog were saying, “I’m still your puppy,” and the owner replied, “I know—and I’ll take good care of you.”
The muzzle-grasp behavior can be challenging to classify. Some researchers see it as social or affiliative, others as agonistic, and still others as pacifying. Because its primary function is to confirm and maintain relationships, it may best be considered a social behavior—a ritualized, low-intensity interaction that reinforces trust and cohesion within the group.
Next time your dog gently nudges or invites a muzzle‑grasp, pause for a moment—what you see as a simple dog behavior is, in canine language, a subtle conversation of trust and understanding.
References
Abrantes, R. (1987). Hundesprog. Borgen Forlag, Copenhagen.
Abrantes, R. (1997). The Evolution of Canine Social Behavior. Naperville, IL: Wakan Tanka Publishers.
Cordoni, G., & Palagi, E. (2019). Back to the future: A glance over wolf social behavior to understand dog–human relationship. Animals, 9(11), 991. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani9110991
Zimen, E. (1981). The wolf: His place in the natural world. Souvenir Press Ltd. ISBN 9780285624115
Note: I first wrote about the muzzle grasp behavior in canids in my Danish book Hundesprog (1987), where I called it “mund om snuden,” which translates directly as “mouth around the snout.” This term became “muzzle grasp” in the first English edition of the book, titled Dog Language. I later wrote Muzzle Grab Behavior in Canids on April 25, 2012. Two years afterward, on March 13, 2014, I revised it as Canine Muzzle Grasp Behavior—Advanced Dog Language. True to my philosophy of updating articles and papers as new evidence emerges, I have once again revised this work. The latest version, published in November 2025, appears here under the title Muzzle Grasp Behavior in Canids.
Canine maternal behavior is more than just feeding the pups. It is also to teach them dog language (Illustration by Alice Rasmussen from “Dog Language” by Roger Abrantes).
Watching dog mothers take care of their pups continues to fascinate me, and the large populations of village dogs in Africa and Thailand, where I spent and spend a great deal of my time, provides me with plenty of opportunities to do it. Village dogs are domestic dogs, not wild dogs. Often classified as stray dogs by the inept, ignorant eye of the western tourist, these dogs perform an important task in their communities of humans and their domestic animals.
Maternal behavior is behavior shown by a mother toward her offspring. In most species, it is the mother that primarily takes care of the youngsters, and the dog is no exception. Natural selection has favored the evolution of this particular behavior of the females.
In wild canids, although it is mostly the female that takes care of the puppies, the father (also called the alpha male) and other adults do become interested in the feeding and raising of the puppies when they begin emerging from the den. In the studies my team did in the 80s, our dogs showed the same pattern in a domestic set-up.
Maternal behavior is, thus, almost identical in wild a canids and domestic dogs. Immediately after birth, the mother dries the puppies, keeps them warm, feeds them and licks them clean. The maternal behavior right after birth is controlled by hormonal processes and problems may occur if the female gives birth too early. On the other hand, pseudo-pregnancy causes females to undergo hormonal changes which may elicit maternal behavior in various degrees. Maternal behavior seems to be self-reinforcing. Studies show that the levels of dopamine increase in the nucleus accumbens (a region of the brain) when a female displays maternal behavior.
When the puppies become older, the mother begins to educate them. She gives them the first lessons in dog language about the time weaning begins. Growling, snarling and the various pacifying behaviors are inborn, but the puppies need to learn their function.
The canine mother has three main tasks: (1) to feed the puppies, first with her own milk, then by regurgitation, (2) to keep them clean and warm, especially when they are very young, and (3) to educate the puppies.
A good canine mother is patient and diligent. When the puppies grow, dog owners often misunderstand the mother’s apparently more violent educational methods. She may growl at them and even attack them, but she never harms them. Muzzle grabbing (see illustrations) is fairly common. Without the mother’s intervention, the puppies would never become capable social animals and would not be able to function properly in a pack (a group of wild dogs living together is in English called a pack). When the puppies are about 8-10 weeks old, the mother seems to lose some of her earlier interest in them. In normal circumstances, the rest of the pack, then, takes over the continuing education of the puppies, their social integration in the group (which probably mostly consists of relatives) and their protection.
Dog owners sometimes report problems, e.g. that the mother has no interest in her puppies, or is too violent towards them. These problems are mainly due to our selective breeding (we select for beauty and utility while nature selects for overall fitness, hereby included adequate maternal behavior) and to our lack of understanding of the mother’s needs during and after birth, which often result in the female showing stress, insecurity or aggressive behavior.
Maternal effect is the mother’s influence on her puppies. It can have such an impact on certain behavior patterns that it can be difficult to distinguish between maternal effect and the effect of genetics. For example, observations have shown that a female reacting too nervously or fearfully toward certain sounds may affect her puppies into developing sound phobias beyond what we would expect given the puppies’ specific genotype. The strong influence of the maternal effect on the behavior of her puppies is the main reason why it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assess the hereditary coefficient for particular traits.
Bottom-line: Do not breed females that you suspect will not show reliable maternal behavior. Do not disturb a female with her pups more than absolutely necessary. A good canine mother knows better than you what’s best for her pups.
Fox, M. 1972. Behaviour of Wolves, Dogs, and Related Canids. Harper and Row.
Lopez, Barry H. (1978). Of Wolves and Men. J. M. Dent and Sons Limited.
Mech, L. D. 1970. The wolf: the ecology and behavior of an endangered species. Doubleday Publishing Co., New York.
Mech, L. David (1981). The Wolf: The Ecology and Behaviour of an Endangered Species. University of Minnesota Press.
Mech, L. D. 1988. The arctic wolf: living with the pack. Voyageur Press, Stillwater, Minn.
Mech. L. D. and Boitani, L. 2003. Wolves: Behavior, Ecology, and Conservation. University of Chicago Press.
Scott, J. P. and Fuller, J. L. 1998. Genetics and the Social Behavior of the Dog. University of Chicago Press.
Zimen, E. 1975. Social dynamics of the wolf pack. In The wild canids: their systematics, behavioral ecology and evolution. Edited by M. W. Fox. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York. pp. 336-368.
Zimen, E. 1982. A wolf pack sociogram. In Wolves of the world. Edited by F. H. Harrington, and P. C. Paquet. Noyes Publishers, Park Ridge, NJ.
Does your dog show allelomimetic behavior? I’m sure it does, but don’t worry, it’s not dangerous, except when it is, and yes, it is contagious. Confused? Keep reading.
Allelomimetic behavior is doing what others do. Some behaviors have a strong probability of influencing others to do the same. Animals in constant contact with one another will inevitably develop allelomimetic behavior.
Dogs exhibit various allelomimetic behaviors—walking, running, sitting, lying down, getting up, sleeping, barking, and howling—each of which has a strong tendency to stimulate others to do the same.
Social predators increase their hunting success when they hunt in unison. One individual setting after the prey is likely to trigger the same response in the whole group.
More often than we think, it is our own behavior that triggers our dog’s allelomimetic behavior (photo by SunVilla).
The wolf’s howl is allelomimetic, one more behavior our domestic dogs share with their wild cousins. Howling together functions as social bonding. When one wolf howls, the whole pack may join in, especially if a high-ranking wolf started it. I bet that if you go down on your knees, turn your head up, and howl (provided you are a half-decent howler), your dog will join you; then, it will attempt to show its team spirit by licking your face.
Sleeping and eating are examples of allelomimetic behavior. Dogs and cats tend to sleep and eat at the same time. Barking is also contagious. One barking dog can set the whole neighborhood’s dogs barking.
Synchronizing behavior may be a lifesaver. In prey animals like the deer, zebra, or wildebeest, one individual can trigger the whole herd to flee. This trait is so crucial for self-preservation that farm animals like sheep, cows, and horses still keep it. Grazing also occurs at the same time.
Running after a running child is more often an example of canine allelomimetic behavior than hunting or herding as many dog owners erroneously presume.
Allelomimetic behavior is not restricted to animals of the same species. Animals of different species that live together often exhibit allelomimetic behavior. Dogs can read body language and respond to certain behaviors of their owners without further instruction. An alerted owner triggers his dog’s alertness more often than not.
Puppies show allelomimetic behavior at about five weeks of age. It is an intrinsic part of your dog’s behavior to adjust to the behavior of its companions. Your behavior influences your dog’s behavior in many more instances than you realize.
At the neurological level, when we watch someone perform an action, our own motor system often “echoes” it—a process known as motor resonance. This effect is made possible by mirror neurons, brain cells that activate both when we do something and when we see another individual doing the same. Research suggests that dogs may share this ability: their tendency to move, look, or react in sync with humans may stem from similar neural mirroring processes (Lamontagne & Gaunet, 2024).
From an evolutionary and behavioral standpoint,because we have selected and bred our dogsto be highly sociable and socially promiscuous, they exhibit extended allelomimetic behavior, i.e., not only copying the behavior of their closest companions but also that of others. Next time you walk in the park and your dog runs after running children, you can casually comment, “Typical instance of allelomimetic behavior.” Not that it will solve any problem, if there is one, but you’ll be right, and I bet you will impress more than a few of your fellow park walkers.
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References
Abrantes, R. (1997). Dog language: An encyclopedia of canine behavior. Wakan Tanka Publishers.
Lamontagne, A., & Gaunet, F. (2024). Behavioural synchronisation between dogs and humans: Unveiling interspecific motor resonance? Animals, 14(4), 548. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani14040548
Scott, J. P., & Marston, M. V. (1950). Social facilitation and allelomimetic behavior in dogs. II. The effects of unfamiliarity. Behaviour, 2(3), 135–143. Retrieved from https://mouseion.jax.org/stfb1950_1959/19/
Vogel, H. H., Scott, J. P., & Marston, M. V. (1950). Social facilitation and allelomimetic behavior in dogs. I. Social facilitation in a non-competitive situation. Behaviour, 2(3), 121–134. Retrieved from https://mouseion.jax.org/stfb1950_1959/24/
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Note: Careful ethological observation sometimes anticipates neurobehavioral discoveries by decades. I described canine allelomimetic behavior in my 1987 book Hundesprog (later published in English as Dog Language, 1997)—a phenomenon that would only gain neurobiological support 34 years later with the findings of Lamontagne and Gaunet (2024), which strongly suggest the potential existence of interspecific motor resonance.
I receive many emails with questions about animal behavior. Most of them involve practical issues, but, now and then, someone poses a more complex question. Here is my answer to one of the latter, one I’d like to share with you because it addresses crucial issues in our understanding of animal behavior and training.
Dear ….,
Thanks for your comment, which allows me to clarify a few issues. By no means do I see animals as biological robots, nor do I regard the Skinnerian approach as the truth, the only truth, and nothing but the truth; quite the contrary. Please consider the following passages from “Mission SMAF—Bringing Scientific Precision Into Animal Training”.
“In fact, I suspect that [communication] even involves more than what science can describe with the intrinsic limitations of its key concepts and methods, no matter how stringent they are.
It seems to me, therefore, that our goal must not be to oppress or suppress emotions, but rather control them and use them advantageously. Emotional arousal proves to be necessary to learn and the right amount of emotional arousal even shows to increase the efficiency of learning processes.”
A very non-Skinnerian statement, I would say.
As to my own method to analyze learning processes in artificial set-ups (like in animal training), I write: “In a crude sense, SMAF is an oversimplification of complex processes […] certainly not an attempt to reduce complex mechanisms to a few formulas. In the end, [its] value depends solely on its successful application to solving practical problems; beyond that, it has no value.”
Operant conditioning (when we use it correctly) is an efficient model of behavior for animal training because we control the conditionals to some extent (as Pavlov explains in his original writings, not the subsequent translations). Whilst operant conditioning is adequate for analyzing behavior at a particular level, beyond that, it becomes too crude an instrument. To understand behavior in a broader sense, we must turn to evolutionary models and concepts—variation, selection, adaptation, fitness, function, evolutionary strategies, ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy), costs and benefits, and so forth. My approach to behavior is therefore a classical ethological one, in the tradition of von Frisch, Lorenz, and Tinbergen—firmly grounded in evolutionary biology and in philosophically coherent reasoning.
Greetings,
RAA
The core of the argument is reductionism, the view that we can reduce complex processes to the sum of their simpler parts. In a sense, all science is reductionistic. We attempt to explain complex processes with a few notions well organized in little boxes. That is a process that seems to suit our human brain particularly well.
However, we must bear in mind that our interpretations, independently of how good they are, are just our pictures of an elusive reality. They suit our particular umwelten,* but definitely not all of them. They explain parts of it from specific angles so we can make sense of it. Newton and Einstein—the classical example—are (probably) both right, each explaining reality at a different level.
There’s nothing wrong about being a reductionist if only we do not get greedy and attempt to explain far too much with far too little, as in, “That’s it, this is the way things are. Period.” Simplifying often gets us to the point that complicating and oversimplifying have both missed.
In animal training, one theory or method can be as good as another depending on its foundations, approaches, what it attempts to explain, and the practical goals it aims to serve. If both are based on reliable evidence, use well-defined terms, and are logically sound, there’s little to choose between one or the other.
If only animal trainers understood that, I believe we would forgo many senseless disputes. Then again, we can brag about being the most emotional creatures on this big blue marble of ours, can’t we?
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* Umwelt (plural umwelten) in ethology means the world as it is experienced by a particular organism.
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References
Abrantes, R. (2018). Mission SMAF—Bringing Scientific Precision In to Animal Training. Wanka Tanka Pub.
Павлов, И. П. (1926). Двадцатилетний опыт объективного изучения высшей нервной деятельности (поведения) животных. Ленинград: Научное химико-техническое издательство. (Pavlov, I. P. (1926). Twenty Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behavior) of Animals. Leningrad: Scientific Chemical-Technical Publishing House.)
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Uexküll, J. von. (1934). Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. Berlin: Julius Springer. (English translation: A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With A Theory of Meaning, translated by Joseph D. O’Neil, University of Minnesota Press, 2010.)
El tema de la dominancia se nos ha ido de las manos. Solo hay una cosa más absurda e inútil que molestarse en demostrar que la dominancia existe, y es el intento de demostrar que la dominancia no existe. Yo voy a cometer el primero de estos actos inútiles.
Las posibles combinaciones de comportamentos agresivos, temerosos, dominates y sumisos en los caninos sociales (de “Dog Langauge” de Roger Abrantes, ilustración protegida por copyright de Alice Rasmussen).
Dominancia, en el lenguaje corriente, significa «poder e influencia sobre otros». Quiere decir supremacía, superioridad, predominancia, dominio, poder, autoridad, mando, control. Tiene tantos significados y connotaciones que es difícil saber cómo utilizar la palabra en tanto término científico preciso aplicado a las ciencias del comportamiento. Además, los científicos que la utilizan (así como los que la repudian) no se han esforzado demasiado por definirla de una manera exacta, lo que ha contribuido a la actual confusión, discusiones sin sentido, desacuerdos y afirmaciones absurdas.
Es mi intención poner remedio a esto, primero demostrando que la dominancia sí existe, y después estableciendo que hace referencia a un mismo tipo de comportamiento, independientemente de la especie en cuestión. A continuación, daré una definición precisa, pragmática y verificable del término, que será compatible con la teoría de la evolución y nuestros conocimientos sobre la biología. Finalmente, expondré que, si bien es cierto que una buena relación (beneficiosa y estable) no se fundamenta en continuas demostraciones de dominancia/sumisión por parte de los mismos individuos ante los mismos individuos, eso tampoco implica que la dominancia no exista en perros (y en cualquier otra especie). Negar la existencia de la dominancia en perros se ha convertido en una argumentación muy difundida para afirmar que no debemos construir una relación con nuestros perros basada en la dominancia.
Es absurdo sostener que la dominancia no existe cuando tenemos tantas palabras que describen todo lo relacionado con ella. Si no existiera, no tendríamos siquiera una palabra que hiciera referencia a ella. El hecho de que el término exista quiere decir que la hemos visto a nuestro alrededor. Podemos afirmar que la hemos observado y que el término (1) hace referencia únicamente a determinadas relaciones humanas, o que (2) se refiere a determinadas relaciones tanto entre humanos como entre otras especies animales. La segunda opción parece más atractiva, considerando el hecho de que es muy improbable que una condición en particular solo se dé en una única especie. Eso entraría en conflicto con todo lo que sabemos acerca del parentesco entre las especies y su evolución.
Sin embargo, no es descabellado sostener que el término no es aplicable para describir el comportamiento de determinadas especies. Al contrario, dos especies que han evolucionado desde un antepasado común hace billones de años han desarrollado características propias y difieren del antepasado común y entre ellas. De igual modo, especies muy cercanas, que se separaron hace sólo unos miles de años de un antepasado común, pueden presentar características similares o iguales entre ellas y respecto al antepasado común. Algunas especies comparten muchos atributos en común relativos al fenotipo, el genotipo y/o la conducta; otras comparten menos, y otras ninguno. Todo depende de su antepasado común y de su adaptación al entorno.
Los seres humanos y los chimpancés (Homo sapiens y Pan troglodytes) se han separado de su antepasado común hace seis millones de años, de manera que podemos esperar que existan más diferencias entre ellos que entre los perros y los lobos (Canis lupus y Canis lupus familiaris), que se separaron de su antepasado común hace sólo unos 15-20 mil años (y de ninguna manera hace más de 100.000 años). Hay más diferencias en el ADN del hombre y el chimpancé que en el del perro y el lobo (que son prácticamente idénticos salvo por unas pocas mutaciones). Los hombres no pueden reproducirse con chimpancés, mientras que los lobos y los perros pueden tener descendencia fértil. Los hombres y los chimpancés son dos especies completamente diferentes. Los lobos y los perros son dos subespecies de la misma especie.
Teniendo en cuenta estos hechos, podemos esperar que los lobos y los perros compartan un gran número de similitudes, cosa que así es, no solo físicas sino también conductuales. Cualquier lego en la materia lo afirmaría. Sus similitudes a uno u otro nivel son lo que les permite cruzarse entre sí, producir descendencia fértil y comunicarse. Nadie ha cuestionado que los lobos y los perros presentan un amplio repertorio de comportamientos de comunicación en común, y con toda la razón, ya que múltiples estudios confirman que son capaces de comunicarse perfectamente. Sus expresiones faciales y posturas corporales son muy parecidas (exceptuando ciertas razas de perros), con pequeñas diferencias que son menores entre sí que las diferencias culturales que podemos encontrar entre poblaciones de seres humanos geográficamente alejadas.
En una manada estable, los lobos suelen presentar una conducta dominante y sumisa y rara vez una conducta temerosa y agresiva.
Si los lobos y los perros pueden comunicarse, podemos concluir que los elementos básicos y determinantes de su lenguaje deben ser los mismos. Esto quiere decir que aunque han evolucionado en ambientes aparentemente diferentes, mantienen los elementos más anclados de sus características genotípicas. Esto puede ser por tres motivos: (1) los genotipos compartidos son vitales para el organismo, (2) los entornos en que viven al fin y al cabo no son tan diferentes, (3) la evolución necesita más tiempo y condiciones más selectivas (debido a que actúa sobre los fenotipos) antes de que los genotipos cambien de manera radical. La primera razón significa que hay más maneras de no sobrevivir que de sobrevivir, o en otras palabras, que la evolución necesita tiempo para desarrollar formas de vida diferentes y viables; la segunda razón significa que aunque los lobos y los perros (mascotas) viven actualmente en entornos muy diferentes, el fenómeno es todavía reciente. Solo hace unos cien años que los perros están plenamente humanizados. Hasta entonces, eran nuestros compañeros, nuestros animales domésticos, pero todavía tenían un elevado grado de libertad y los factores selectivos exitosos eran básicamente los mismos de siempre. No eran todavía mascotas y la cría no estaba totalmente (o casi totalmente) controlada por la selección humana. La tercera razón significa que quizás un día (de aquí a un millón de años o más), tendremos dos especies totalmente diferentes, perros y lobos. Para entonces, no podrán cruzarse, no producirán descendencia fértil y presentarán características completamente diferentes. Habrán cambiado el nombre, a quizá llamarse Canis civicus o Canis homunculus. ¡Sin embargo, todavía no hemos llegado a eso!
Según las últimas tendencias, el «comportamiento dominante» no existe en el perro, lo que plantea algunos problemas serios. Hay dos maneras de defender esta idea. Una es desechar el concepto «comportamiento dominante» por completo, lo que es absurdo, por las razones que hemos visto antes: el término existe, sabemos más o menos lo que significa y podemos utilizarlo en una conversación con cierto sentido. Por lo tanto, debe referirse a un tipo de comportamiento que hemos observado. Otra argumentación es afirmar que los lobos y los perros son completamente diferentes y, por lo tanto, incluso aunque podamos aplicar el término para explicar el comportamiento del lobo, no podemos utilizarlo para describir el comportamiento del perro. Si fueran completamente diferentes, la argumentación sería válida, pero no lo son, como ya hemos visto. Por el contrario, son muy parecidos.
Una tercera alternativa es construir una teoría totalmente nueva para explicar cómo dos especies tan cercanas como el lobo y el perro (de hecho, subespecies) pueden haber desarrollado en un periodo de tiempo tan breve (miles de años) tantas características radicalmente distintas en un aspecto, pero no en otros. Esto nos llevaría a llevar a cabo una extensa revisión de todos nuestros conocimientos biológicos, lo que tendría implicaciones que van más allá de los lobos y los perros, y ésa es una alternativa que considero poco realista.
Híbrido de perro-lobo (Imagen via Wikipedia).
Una aproximación mucho más atractiva, en mi opinión, es analizar los conceptos que utilizamos y definirlos bien. Así podremos emplearlos con más sentido cuando abordemos las diferentes especies, sin incurrir en incompatibilidades con el mundo científico.
Tener una definición apropiada de «comportamiento dominante» es importante, porque el comportamiento que implica es vital para la supervivencia del individuo, como veremos.
Me parece que es un enfoque pobre desechar la existencia de hechos que están detrás de un término sólo porque el término está mal definido, por no decir que es políticamente incorrecto (lo que significa que no se ajusta a nuestros objetivos inmediatos). El comportamiento dominante existe, simplemente está mal definido (cuando se define). Muchas discusiones relacionadas con este tema no tienen sentido porque ninguna de las partes sabe exactamente de qué habla la otra. Sin embargo, no es necesario tirarlo todo por la borda. Por lo tanto, propongo definiciones precisas tanto del comportamiento dominante como del resto de términos que necesitamos para entenderlo: qué es, qué no es, cómo ha evolucionado y cómo funciona.
El comportamiento dominante es un comportamiento cuantitativo y cuantificable manifestado por un individuo con el objetivo de conseguir o conservar el acceso temporal a un recurso en particular, en una situación en concreto, ante un oponente concreto, sin que ninguna de las partes resulte herida. Si cualquiera de las partes resulta herida, se trata de un comportamiento agresivo, no dominante. Sus características cuantitativas varían desde un ligero aplomo hasta una clara afirmación de la autoridad.
El comportamiento dominante es contextual, individual y está relacionado con los recursos. Un individuo que manifiesta un comportamiento dominante en una situación específica no necesariamente lo va a mostrar en otra ocasión ante otro individuo, o ante el mismo individuo en una situación distinta.
Los recursos son lo que los organismos perciben como necesidades vitales; por ejemplo, la comida, una pareja reproductiva, o parte del territorio. La percepción de lo que un animal puede considerar un recurso depende de la especie y el individuo.
La agresividad (el comportamiento agresivo) es el comportamiento encaminado a eliminar la competencia, mientras que la dominancia, o la agresividad social, es un comportamiento dirigido a eliminar la competencia de un compañero.
Los compañeros son dos o más animales que conviven estrechamente y dependen el uno del otro para su supervivencia. Los extraños son dos o más animales que no conviven estrechamente y no dependen el uno del otro para sobrevivir.
El comportamiento dominante es especialmente importante para animales sociales que necesitan cohabitar y cooperar para sobrevivir. Por lo tanto, se desarrolló una estrategia social con la función de tratar la competencia entre compañeros con unas desventajas mínimas.
Los animales manifiestan comportamientos dominantes con varias señales: visuales, auditivas, olfativas y/o táctiles.
Mientras que el miedo (una conducta temerosa) es un comportamiento dirigido a eliminar una amenaza inminente, el comportamiento de sumisión, o el miedo social, es un comportamiento orientado a eliminar una amenaza social de un compañero; es decir, la pérdida temporal de un recurso sin que nadie se haga daño.
Una amenaza es todo aquello que puede herir, provocar dolor o lesiones, o disminuir las posibilidades de un individuo de sobrevivir. Una amenaza social es cualquier cosa que pueda producir la pérdida temporal de un recurso y que provoque un comportamiento de sumisión o una huida sin que el individuo sumiso termine lesionado.
Los animales manifiestan el comportamiento de sumisión mediante diferentes señales: visuales, auditivas, olfativas y/o táctiles.
Un comportamiento dominante o sumiso persistente de los mismos individuos puede dar lugar o no a una jerarquía temporal con determinadas configuraciones según la especie, la organización social y las circunstancias del entorno. En los grupos estables que ocupan un territorio definido, las jerarquías temporales se desarrollan más fácilmente. En los grupos inestables, en condiciones del entorno cambiantes, o en territorios no definidos o no establecidos, las jerarquías no se desarrollan. Las jerarquías, o más bien las estrategias implicadas, son Estrategias Estables Evolutivas (EEE), que son siempre ligeramente inestables, que oscilan constantemente alrededor de un valor óptimo según el número de individuos de cada grupo y las estrategias individuales que cada uno adopta en un momento determinado, Las jerarquías no son necesariamente lineales, aunque en grupos pequeños y con el tiempo, las jerarquías no lineales parecen tender a ser más lineales.
Algunos individuos tienden a mostrar comportamientos dominantes y otros a mostrar comportamientos sumisos. Eso puede depender de su configuracióngenética, su aprendizaje a una edad temprana, su historial, etc. Eso no significa que lo determine un solo factor, sino que se trata de una compleja mezcla. Llamémoslo tendencia natural, lo que no quiere decir que no sea modificable. Es un hecho que algunos individuos son más autoritarios que otros, mientras que otros son más condescendientes, por muchas razones. No estamos diciendo que esto sea bueno o malo, simplemente exponemos un hecho; que sea bueno o malo —no en un sentido moral— más bien significa que es más o menos ventajoso según el contexto. En los encuentros cara a cara, en condiciones de igualdad, hay más probabilidades de que los individuos adopten la estrategia con la que se encuentran más cómodos, manteniendo por lo tanto su historial de básicamente dominantes o básicamente sumisos.
Cuando están en un grupo de mayor tamaño, tendrán la misma tendencia de desempeñar los roles con los que se sienten más cómodos. Esto puede cambiar, sin embargo, debido a la estructura formada accidentalmente del grupo. Imagina un grupo con varios individuos con una mayor tendencia a tener comportamientos sumisos que dominantes, y con sólo unos pocos individuos con la tendencia opuesta. En una situación así, un individuo por naturaleza sumiso tendrá más posibilidades de acceder a un recurso y tener éxito mostrando un comportamiento más dominante. El éxito genera éxito, y poco a poco, este individuo, que en otras condiciones sería predominantemente sumiso, se encuentra con que es principalmente dominante. Si la situación permite al individuo cambiar su estrategia preferente, los demás también tendrán las mismas oportunidades. El número de individuos dominantes aumentará, pero el número de individuos dominantes que puede sostener un grupo no es ilimitado, porque en un momento dado será más ventajoso asumir el papel de sumiso, según los costes y los beneficios.
Por lo tanto, el número de individuos dominantes y sumisos no sólo depende de la tendencia natural del individuo, sino también de la configuración de los grupos y sus características. Si compensa tener un papel dominante o sumiso en el fondo es algo que depende de los costes y beneficios y del número de individuos que adoptan una estrategia en particular.
Entender las relaciones entre comportamientos dominantes y sumisos como una EEE (Estrategia Estable Evolutiva) abre perspectivas de lo más emocionantes, que pueden ayudar a explicar los comportamientos adoptados por un individuo determinado en un momento dado. Un individuo sumiso aprenderá a desempeñar el papel de sumiso ante otros individuos más dominantes y el de dominante ante otros más sumisos. Eso significa que ningún individuo es en principio siempre dominante o siempre sumiso; todo depende del contrario y, por supuesto, del valor de los beneficios potenciales y los costes estimados.
Por consiguiente, las jerarquías (cuando existen) siempre serán ligeramente inestables según las estrategias adoptadas por los individuos que forman el grupo. Las jerarquías no son necesariamente lineales y sólo se dan en pequeños grupos o subgrupos.
En opinión de este autor, el error que hemos cometido hasta ahora es considerar la dominancia y la sumisión como algo más o menos estático. No hemos tenido en cuenta que estas características, como los fenotipos y todos los demás rasgos, están constantemente bajo el escrutinio y la presión de la selección natural. Son adaptativas, muy variables y altamente cuantitativas y cuantificables.
Como tal, la dominancia y la sumisión son rasgos dinámicos que dependen de diversas variables, visión que es compatible con el desarrollo del comportamiento a un nivel individual, las funciones genéticas, la influencia del aprendizaje y, cómo no, la teoría de la evolución.
La dominancia y la sumisión son mecanismos maravillosos desde un punto de vista evolutivo. Es lo que permite a los animales (sociales) vivir juntos, sobrevivir hasta que se hayan reproducido y transmitir sus genes (dominantes y sumisos) a la siguiente generación. Sin estos mecanismos, no tendríamos animales sociales como los seres humanos, los chimpancés, los lobos y los perros, entre muchos otros.
Si un animal resolviera todos los conflictos intergrupales con comportamientos agresivos y temerosos, estaría agotado cuando se viera obligado a buscar la comida, una pareja reproductiva, un lugar seguro para descansar o cuidar de su progenie (y todo ello disminuiría las oportunidades de sobrevivir tanto de él como de sus genes). Por consiguiente, se originó y desarrolló la estrategia del compañero y el extraño. Es imposible luchar contra todos todo el tiempo, de manera que con los compañeros se utilizan mecanismos que consumen poca energía en las confrontaciones.
Los comportamientos dominantes y sumisos controlan asimismo la densidad de población, ya que dependen del reconocimiento individual. El número de reconocimientos individuales que es capaz de realizar un animal debe tener un límite. Si este limite es muy alto, el reconocimiento se vuelve ineficiente, inactivando la estrategia compañero/extraño; en ese caso, las expresiones de miedo/agresividad sustituirán a los comportamientos de sumisión/dominancia.
La estrategia de sumisión es sabia. En lugar de enzarzarse en vano en una lucha desesperada, puede resultar mucho más provechoso esperar. Recurriendo a un comportamiento pacifico y sumiso, los subordinados a menudo pueden seguir los pasos de los dominantes y aprovechar oportunidades que les dan acceso a recursos vitales. Mostrando sumisión, gozan además de las ventajas de pertenecer a un grupo, en especial la defensa ante los rivales.
Las jerarquías funcionan porque el subordinado normalmente se aparta, mostrando un típico comportamiento apaciguador, sin signos aparentes de miedo. Por lo tanto, el dominante puede sencillamente desplazar al sumiso cuando está comiendo o cuando desea un espacio. Las jerarquías en la naturaleza a menudo son muy sutiles, difíciles de descubrir por el observador. El motivo de esta sutileza es la razón de ser de la propia dominancia-sumisión: el animal subordinado suele evitar los encontronazos y al dominante tampoco le entusiasman las escaramuzas.
Pelear implica cierto riesgo y puede dar lugar a graves lesiones, o incluso a la muerte. La evolución, por consiguiente, tiende a favorecer y desarrollar mecanismos que limitan la intensidad de los comportamientos agresivos. Muchas especies tienen claras señales que expresan la aceptación de la derrota, lo que pone fin a las peleas antes de que se produzcan lesiones.
Aprender a reconocer las señales-estímulos es la tarea más importante para las crías nada más nacer. Les salva la vida. La lección más importante que aprende un joven social después de aprender las señales–estímulos fundamentales para mantenerse con vida es la capacidad de transigir. Mantiene la salud de la vida social del grupo. La selección natural lo ha demostrado, favoreciendo a los individuos que han desarrollado comportamientos que les permiten permanecer juntos. Otros animales, los depredadores solitarios, no necesitan estos rasgos sociales. Estos organismos encuentran otras maneras de mantener su metabolismo y reproducción.
Aprender a ser social significa aprender a transigir. Los animales sociales pasan mucho tiempo juntos y los conflictos son inevitables. Tiene su lógica que desarrollen mecanismos con los que responder a las hostilidades. Limitar el comportamiento de agresividad y miedo mediante la inhibición y la ritualización sólo es parcialmente seguro. Cuanto más social es el animal, más obligatorios son los mecanismos eficaces. La agresión inhibida sigue siendo una agresión; es como jugar con fuego un día de viento. Resulta eficaz para animales menos sociales o menos agresivos, pero los animales muy sociales y más agresivos necesitan otros mecanismos.
A largo plazo, seria muy peligroso y agotador estar constantemente recurriendo a laagresión y el miedo para resolver problemas triviales. Los animales presentan síntomas de estrés patológico después de un tiempo en que se sienten constantemente amenazados o necesitan atacar constantemente a otros. Esto significa que los depredadores sociales necesitan otros mecanismos aparte de la agresividad y el miedo para resolver animosidades sociales. Tengo la teoría de que los animales sociales, a través de la ontogenia de la agresión y el miedo, desarrollan otros dos comportamientos sociales igual de importantes. Mientras que una agresión significa: «lárgate, muérete, no vuelvas a molestarme», una agresión social significa: «lárgate, pero no demasiado lejos, ni demasiado tiempo». Igualmente, el miedo social dice: «No te molestaré si no me haces daño», mientras que el miedo existencial no permite transigir en nada: «o tú o yo».
La diferencia significativa entre los dos tipos de comportamientos agresivos parece ser la función. La agresión se emplea para tratar con los extraños, y la agresión social se emplea para tratar con los compañeros. En cambio, el miedo y el miedo social son tanto para el trato con los extraños como para el trato con los compañeros. Éstas son diferencias cualitativas que justifican la creación de nuevos términos; de allí que se hable de dominancia y sumisión.
¿Qué significado tiene esto en nuestra manera de entender a nuestros perros y nuestra relación con ellos?
Significa que todos nosotros mostramos comportamientos dominantes (seguridad en uno mismo, afirmación de la autoridad, firmeza, contundencia) y sumisos (inseguridad, aceptación, concesión, capitulación), según diversos factores, por ejemplo: estado de ánimo, posición social, recursos, salud, el oponente en cuestión, y eso se da tanto entre los seres humanos como entre los perros (y los lobos, por supuesto). Esto no tiene nada de malo, excepto cuando presentamos un comportamiento dominante en situaciones en que sería más ventajoso presentar un comportamiento sumiso, y viceversa. A veces podemos ser más dominantes o sumisos, y otras veces menos. Se trata de comportamientos muy cuantitativos y cuantificables, con muchas variantes. No hay una única estrategia correcta. Todo dependerá de la flexibilidad y la estrategia adoptada por los demás.
Por supuesto, nosotros no construimos las relaciones estables y beneficiosas a largo plazo basándolas en los comportamientos dominantes o sumisos. Éstos son comportamientos necesarios para resolver los inevitables conflictos sociales. Construimos las relaciones basándolas en la necesidad de compañía –tanto nosotros como los perros (y los lobos, por supuesto)– para resolver problemas comunes relacionados con la supervivencia y preferentemente con un nivel aceptable de confort. No construimos las relaciones basándolas en las jerarquías, pero éstas existen y desempeñan un papel importante en determinadas circunstancias –tanto para los seres humanos como para los perros (y para los lobos, por supuesto)-, a veces más, a veces menos, a veces nada.
Construimos nuestra (buena) relación particular con nuestros perros basándola en el compañerismo. Los necesitamos porque nos dan una sensación de logro que no parece que consigamos en otra parte. Ellos nos necesitan porque el mundo esta superpoblado, los recursos son limitados y como dueños les proporcionamos comida, protección, cuidados, un lugar seguro y compañía (son animales sociales). ¡Es muy duro ser un perrito y estar solo en este mundo tan grande! A veces, en esta relación, una de las partes recurre a un comportamiento dominante o sumiso y eso no tiene nada de malo siempre y cuando las dos partes no exhiban el mismo comportamiento a la vez. Si ambos muestran comportamiento dominante o sumiso, tienen un problema: habrá un conflicto que se resolverá la mayor parte de las veces sin lesiones (eso es lo maravilloso de la dominancia y la sumisión), o uno de los dos tendrá que dejarse de tonterías e imponer su buen juicio.
Una buena relación con nuestros perros no requiere ningún mecanismo en particular ni misterioso. Ocurre básicamente lo mismo con todas las buenas relaciones, teniendo en cuenta las características especificas de la especie y los individuos implicados. No necesitamos nuevos términos. No necesitamos nuevas teorías para explicarlo. No somos, al fin y al cabo, tan especiales, y tampoco lo son nuestros perros. Estamos todos construidos a partir del mismo concepto y con los mismos ingredientes básicos. Sólo necesitamos buenas definiciones y un enfoque menos emocional y más racional. Utiliza tu corazón para disfrutar de tu perro (y de tu vida) y tu razón para explicarlo (si lo necesitas), y no al revés. Si no te gustan mis definiciones, crea otras que sean mejores (con más ventajas y menos desventajas), pero no malgastes tu tiempo (ni el de nadie) con discusiones sin sentido y reacciones viscerales. La vida es preciosa y cada momento malgastado es un bocado menos del pastel que has devorado sin siquiera darte cuenta.
Así es como yo lo veo y me parece hermoso: ¡que disfrutes de tu pastel!
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Gracias a Simon Gadbois (merci), Tilde Detz (tak), Victor Ros (gracias), Sue McCabe (go raibh math agate) y Parichart Abrantes (ขอบคุณครับ) por sus sugerencias para mejorar este artículo. Los fallos que puedan quedar son cosa mía, no suya.
So you like detection work and agility tricks, you are fascinated by the Hero Rats detecting landmines and you’d like to learn some tricks that could make you a better dog trainer. I’m not going to teach you to train a police detection dog or a landmine-detecting rat—that is reserved for the professionals in those areas—but I will instruct you how to train a guinea pig to detect tobacco and gunpowder, and to perform agility tricks.
Police guinea pig? Not just yet, but who knows. You could be the trainer of the first tobacco and gunpowder detecting guinea pig.
Why should dog trainers train guinea pigs?
Training dogs is easy compared to training other species due to the special relationship between humans and dogs. Dogs tend to overlook most of our mistakes and give us a second chance. Animals that don’t have such a close relationship with humans are far less forgiving so it is a high priority to be precise, to plan your training, to develop your observation skills and to have a plan B available. Training guinea pigs will help make you a better, more observant dog trainer; more attentive to detail and more receptive to the feedback your dog gives you.
Another advantage of training guinea pigs is that you won’t have a strong bond with the guinea pig you train and you will therefore be more objective than in your dog training. You will not have developed any bad habits, as training guinea pigs will be novel to you. You won’t identify with the guinea pig you train in the same way dog owners identify with their dogs, so you will not feel embarrassed if your guinea pig makes a mistake.
Training a guinea pig will improve your theoretical knowledge as well as your mechanical skills. You will be amazed at how much you can teach a guinea pig in just four days!
Guinea pigs, Cavia porcellus, also called cavies, are social rodents. Their sight is not as good as that of humans, but they have well-developed senses of hearing, smell and touch.
The Guinea Pigs
Each team of three students will have a guinea pig to train, a training box, agility obstacles, food treats and a whistle (or clicker). Each student within a team will take turns to be trainer, observer and camera operator. The trainer trains, the observer registers the session and ensures it follows the previously designed POA (Plan Of Action), and the camera operator films the session. Since all three will follow a carefully designed plan, there is no problem in taking turns at training the same guinea pig. The team’s training will be mostly consistent but, should small variations occur, we will regard them as a bonus and an opportunity to compare factors that may influence training. That’s why all the sessions are filmed.
A day at camp
A day starts at 9am and ends at 5pm. Lunch will be between 12pm and 1pm. Teams decide when to take a break.
About 60% of the coursework comprises of hands-on training and 40% of theoretical issues such as designing POAs, reviewing training sessions, studying videos, briefing and debriefing teams.
The maximum number of students is thirty (ten teams).
Prerequisites
You must have read “The 20 Principles that All Animal Trainers Must Know.” Click the link (available soon, also in French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian) to access the free manual.
Vocalization is the guinea pig’s primary means of communication. At Guinea Pig Camp, you’ll learn the differences between a wheek, purring, rumbling, whining, chattering, squealing and chirping.
Fees
As we want to offer everyone the opportunity to attend a Guinea Pig Camp, we keep the fees low: EUR 395 (in Europe, except Portugal EUR 295), USD 495 (in the USA), AUS 495 (in Australia), CND 495 (in Canada) and JPY 44,500 (in Japan). This fee does not include accommodation, transportation and meals.
Event organizers may need to adjust these fees slightly to accommodate particular local conditions (please see their individual websites).
Dates, locations and registration
To register, please use the contact details below.
Our Guinea Pig Camp is something you’ll have to experience. It’s amazing how much these cute, little creatures can learn and how much they can teach us. Don’t worry if you fall in love with your guinea pig—you can take it home after the workshop, that is, if your teammates allow you.
Guinea Pig Camps are about learning, enjoying teamwork and having fun!
“Whether you (or I) follow a particular line of morality is not a necessary consequence of any model of social behavior. Moral stances are solely your (or my) decision” (Picture by Lisa J. Bains).
The dog trainers’ dispute about training methods blazes on unabated, with the erroneous and emotive use of terms such as dominance, punishment and leadership only adding fuel to the fire. There is no rational argumentation between the two main factions, one of which advocates a “naturalistic” approach and the other a “moralistic” stance. The term ‘dominance’ generates particular controversy and is often misinterpreted. We can detect, in the line of arguing about this topic, the same fundamental mistakes committed in many other discussions. By taking the controversy over dominant behavior as my example, I shall attempt to put an end to the feud by proving that neither side is right and by presenting a solution to the problem. Plus ratio quam vis—let reason prevail over force!
I shall demonstrate that the dispute is caused by:
(1) Blurring the boundaries between science and ethics. While ethics and morality deal with normative statements, science deals with factual, descriptive statements. Scientific statements are not morally right or wrong, good or bad.
(2) Unclear definitions. We cannot have a rational discussion without clear definitions of the terms used. Both sides in the dispute use unclear, incomplete definitions or none at all.
(3) Logical fallacies. The opposing sides commit either the ‘naturalistic fallacy,’ ‘the moralistic fallacy,’ or both. We cannot glean normative statements from descriptive premises, nor can we deduce facts from norms. The fact that something is does not imply that it ought to be; conversely, just because something oughtto be does not mean that it is.
(4) Social conditioning and emotional load. As a result of inevitable social conditioning and emotional load, some terms develop connotations that can affect whether we like or dislike, accept or reject them, independent of their true meaning.
(5) Unclear grammar. The term dominance (an abstract noun) leads us to believe it is a characteristic of certain individuals, not an attribute of behavior. The correct use of the term in the behavioral sciences is as an adjective to describe a behavior, hence dominant behavior.
Bottom line: We need to define terms clearly and use them consistently; otherwise rational discussion is not possible. We must separate descriptive and normative statements, as we cannot derive what is from what oughtto be or vice versa. Therefore, we cannot use the scientific concept of dominant behavior (or any descriptive statement) to validate an ethical principle. Our morality, what we think is right or wrong, is a personal choice; what is, or is not, is independent of our beliefs and wishes (we don’t have a choice).
Solution to the problem: The present dispute focuses on whether we believe it is right or wrong to dominate others (as in, totally control, have mastery over, command). It is a discussion of how to achieve a particular goal, about means and ends. It is a moral dispute, not a scientific quest. If both sides have similar goals in training their dogs, one way of settling the dispute is to prove that one strategy is more efficient than the other. If they are equally efficient, the dispute concerns the acceptability of the means. However, if either side has different goals, it is impossible to compare strategies.
My own solution of the problem: I cannot argue with people who believe it is right to dominate others (including non-human animals) as, even though I can illustrate how dominating others does not lead to harmony, I can’t make anyone choose harmony or define it in a particular way. I cannot argue with people who think it acceptable to hurt others in order to achieve their goals because such means are inadmissible to me. I cannot argue with people who deny or affirm a particular matter of fact as a means of justifying their moral conduct, because my mind rejects invalid, unsound arguments. With time, the rational principles that govern my mind and the moral principles that regulate my conduct may prove to be the fittest. Meanwhile, as a result of genetic pre-programming, social conditioning and evolutionary biology, I do enjoy being kind to other animals, respecting them for what they are and interacting with them on equal terms; I don’t believe it is right to subjugate them to my will, to command them, to change them; and I don’t need a rational justification as to why that’s right for me*.
“I do enjoy being kind to other animals, respecting them for what they are and interacting with them on equal premises; I don’t find it right to subjugate them to my will and dispositions, to command them, to change them; and I don’t need a rational justification for why that’s right for me” (Picture by Lisa J. Bain).
Argument
1 Science and ethics are not the same
Science is a collection of coherent, useful and probable predictions. All science is reductionist and visionary in a sense, but that does not mean that all reductionism is equally useful or that all visions are equally valuable or that one far-out idea is as acceptable as any other. Greedy reductionism is bound to fail because it attempts to explain too much with too little, classifying processes too crudely, overlooking relevant detail and missing pertinent evidence. Science sets up rational, reasonable, credible, useful and usable explanations based on empirical evidence, which is not connected per se. Any connections are made via our scientific models, ultimately allowing us to make reliable and educated predictions. A scientist needs to have an imaginative mind in order to think the unthinkable, discover the unknown and formulate initially far-fetched but verifiable hypotheses that may provide new and unique insights; as Kierkegaard writes, “This, then, is the ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think.”
There are five legitimate criteria when evaluating a scientific theory or model: (1) evidence, (2) logic, (3) compatibility, (4) progression, and (5) flexibility.
(1) Evidence: a scientific theory or model must be based on credible and objective evidence. If there is credible evidence against it, we dismiss it. It must be testable and falsifiable.
(2) Logic: If a theory or model is based on logically invalid arguments or its conclusion are logically unsound, e.g. drawing valid conclusions from false premises, we must also dismiss it.
(3) Compatibility: If a theory or model shows crucial incompatibility with the whole body of science, then it is probably incorrect. If it is incompatible with another model, then we have a paradox. Paradoxes are not to be discarded, instead worked on and solved (or not solved as the case may be). Since “Paradoxes do not exist in reality, only in our current models of reality, […] they point the way to flaws in our current models. They therefore also point the way to further research to improve those models, fix errors, or fill in missing pieces.” In short, “scientists love paradoxes,” in the words of Novella.
(4) Progression: A scientific theory or model must explain everything that has already been explained by earlier theories, whilst adding new information, or explaining it in simpler terms.
(5) Flexibility: A theory or model must be able to accept new data and be corrected. If it doesn’t, then it is a dogma, not a scientific theory. A dogma is a belief accepted by a group as incontrovertibly true.
Science provides facts and uncovers important relationships between these facts. Sciencedoes not tell us how we should behave or what we ought to do. Science is descriptive, not normative. In other words: we decide what is right or wrong, good or bad, not necessarily depending on what science tells us.
Morality and science are two separate disciplines. I may not like the conclusions and implications of some scientific studies, I may even find their application immoral; yet, my job as a scientist is to report my findings objectively. Reporting facts does not oblige me to adopt any particular moral stance. The way I feel about a fact is not constrained by what science tells me. I may be influenced by it but, ultimately, my moral decision is independent of scientific fact. Science tells me men and women are biologically different in some aspects, but it does not tell me whether or not they should be treated equally in the eyes of the law. Science tells me that evolution is based on the algorithm “the survival of the fittest,” not whether or not I should help those that find it difficult to fit into their environment. Science informs me of the pros and cons of eating animal products, but it does not tell me whether it is right or wrong to be a vegetarian.
Ethologists study behavior on a biological and evolutionary basis, define the terms they use, find causal relationships, construct models for the understanding of behavior and report their findings. Ethologists are not concerned with morality. They simply inform us that the function of x behavior is y. They don’t tell us that because animal x does y, then y is right or wrong, good or bad, or that we ought or ought not do y.
The model I present in “Dominance—Making Sense of the Nonsense” is a scientific model that complies with all five of the requirements listed above.
(1) It is based on overwhelming data, i.e. given my definition of ‘dominant behavior,’ one cannot argue that it does not exist.
(2) The conclusions are logically consistent with the premises.
(3) It is consistent with our body of knowledge, particularly in the fields of biology and evolutionary theory.
(4) It explains what has been explained before and in more carefully defined terms.
(5) It accepts new data, adjustments and corrections (the current version is an updated version of my original from 1986). The model tells us nothing about morality. No single passage suggests that we should classify any particular relationship with our dogs as morally right or wrong. You will have to decide that for yourself. As an ethologist, I’m not concerned with what ought to be, only with what is. Echoing Satoshi Kanazawa, if I conclude something that is not supported by evidence, I commit a logical fallacy, which I must correct, and that’s my problem, but if my conclusion offends your beliefs, then that’s your problem.
Therefore, whether you (or I) follow a particular line of morality is not a consequence of any model of social behavior. Moral stances are solely your (or my) decision. It is not correct to draw normative judgments from descriptive claims. If you do so, you either commit the ‘naturalistic fallacy,’ the ‘moralistic fallacy’ or both, as I shall explain below (see point 3).
2 Unclear definitions
Having just pointed out the rigors of science, I must concede that the scientific community does bear some responsibility for the present dispute in as much as definitions and use of terms have sometimes been sloppy. Some researchers use particular terms (in this case ‘dominance’) without defining them properly and with slightly different implications from paper to paper.
Wikipedia writes: “Dominance (ethology) can be defined as an ‘individual’s preferential access to resources over another’ (Bland 2002). Dominance in the context of biology and anthropology is the state of having high social status relative to one or more other individuals, who react submissively to dominant individuals. This enables the dominant individual to obtain access to resources such as food or access to potential mates, at the expense of the submissive individual, without active aggression. The opposite of dominance is submissiveness. […] In animal societies, dominance is typically variable across time, […] across space […] or across resources. Even with these factors held constant, perfect dominant hierarchies are rarely found in groups of any size” (Rowell 1974 and Lorenz 1963).
It explains a dominance hierarchy as follows: “Individuals with greater hierarchical status tend to displace those ranked lower from access to space, to food and to mating opportunities. […] These hierarchies are not fixed and depend on any number of changing factors, among them are age, gender, body size, intelligence, and aggressiveness.”
Firstly, defining ‘dominance’ instead of ‘dominant behavior’ seems somewhat imprudent for a science that is intrinsically based on observational facts. It suggests we are dealing with an abstract quality when in fact we are referring to observable behavior (see point 5 below). Secondly, it implicitly equates ‘dominance’ with hierarchy (social status), which is misleading because some hierarchies may be supported by conditions other than dominant behavior. The use of the term ‘dominance hierarchy’ creates a false belief. Clearly, the terms dominance and dominant behavior are attributed with varying meanings, a highly unadvisable practice, particularly in stringently scientific matters.
As John Locke wrote in 1690 (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding), “The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which have so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they speak different languages. ”This has contributed […] to perplex the signification of words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things.”
To remedy this, I propose in “Dominance—Making Sense of the Nonsense” a set of carefully constructed definitions that are compatible with behavioral science and evolutionary theory, whilst paying special attention to the logical validity and consistency of the arguments. I’m convinced that we would avoid many pointless disputes if all those dealing with the behavioral sciences were to adopt such definitions.
Roughly speaking, there are currently two main schools of thought in dog training. For our present purpose, we shall call them ‘Naturalistic Dog Training’ and ‘Moralistic Dog Training.’ Of course, there are various other stances in between these two extremes, including a significantly large group of bewildered dog owners who do not adhere to any particular ideology, not knowing which way to turn.
Naturalistic Dog Training (aka the old school) claims their training echoes the dog’s natural behavior. They don’t provide a proper definition of dominance, but use it with connotations of ‘leader,’ ‘boss,’ ‘rank,’ implying that dominance is a characteristic of an individual, not of a behavior. In their eyes, some dogs are born dominant, others submissive, but all dogs need to be dominated because their very nature is to dominate or be dominated. They use this belief to justify their training methods that often involve punishment, flooding, coercion, and even shock collars, if deemed necessary, by the more extreme factions. For them, a social hierarchy is based on (assertive) dominance and (calm) submission, the leader being the most dominant. Their willingness to accept the existence of dominant behavior is motivated by their desire to validate their training theories, but their interpretation of the term is far from what ethologists understand by it.
Moralistic Dog Training (aka positive reinforcement training) distances itself from punishment, dominance, and leadership. They don’t define ‘dominance’ properly either, but use it with connotations of ‘punishment,’ ‘aggression,’ ‘coercion,’ ‘imposition.’ They claim dominance does not exist and regard it as a mere construct of philosophers and ethologists aimed at justifying the human tendency to dominate others. Their view is that we should nurture our dogs as if they were part of our family and should not dominate them. Therefore, they also distance themselves from using and condoning the use of terms like ‘alpha,’ ‘leader’ and ‘pack.’ The more extreme factions claim to refrain from using any aversive or signal that might be slightly connected with an aversive (like the word ‘no’) and deny their using of punishers (which, given the consensually accepted scientific definition of punishment, is a logical impossibility). Their refusal to accept the existence of dominant behavior is motivated by their desire to validate their training morality, but their interpretation of the term is again far from what ethologists understand by it.
An ethological definition of ‘dominant behavior’ is (as I suggest in “Dominance—Making Sense of the Nonsense”): “Dominant behavior is a quantitative and quantifiable behavior displayed by an individual with the function of gaining or maintaining temporary access to a particular resource on a particular occasion, versus a particular opponent, without either party incurring injury. If any of the parties incur injury, then the behavior is aggressive and not dominant. Its quantitative characteristics range from slightly self-confident to overtly assertive.”
This is a descriptive statement, a classification of a class of behaviors, so we can distinguish it from other classes of behaviors, based on the observable function of behavior (according to evolutionary theory). It is clearly distinguishable from the statements of both opposing mainstream dog-training groups in that it does not include any normative guidance.
3 Logical fallacies
A logical fallacy is unsound reasoning with untrue premises or an illogical conclusion. Logical fallacies are inherent in the logic structure or argumentation strategy and suit irrational desires rather than actual matters of fact.
An argument can be valid or invalid; and valid arguments can be sound or unsound. A deductive argument is valid if, and only if, the conclusion is entailed by the premises (it is a logical consequence of the premises). An argument is sound if, and only if, (1) the argument is valid and (2) all of its premises are true. The pure hypothetical syllogism is only valid if it has the following forms:
If P ⇒ Q and Q ⇒ R, then P ⇒ R
If P ⇒ ~R and ~R ⇒ ~Q, then P ⇒ ~Q
This mixed hypothetical syllogism has two valid forms, affirming the antecedent or “modus ponens” and denying the consequent or “modus tollens”:
If P ⇒ Q and P, then Q (modus ponens)
If P ⇒ Q and ~Q, then ~P (modus tollens)
It has two invalid forms (affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent).
The naturalistic fallacy is the mistake of identifying what is good with a natural property. In this fallacy, something considered natural is usually considered to be good, and something considered unnatural is regarded as bad. The structure of the argument is “P is natural, therefore P is moral” or “P is natural and non-P is unnatural, natural things are moral and unnatural things immoral, therefore P is moral and non-P immoral.” G. E. Moore coined the term naturalistic fallacy in 1903 in “Principia Ethica.” It is related to the ‘is-ought problem,’ also called ‘Hume’s Law’ or ‘Hume’s Guillotine,’ described for the first time by David Hume in 1739 in “A Treatise of Human Nature.” The ‘is-ought fallacy’ consists of deriving an ought conclusion from an is premise. The structure of the argument is “P is, what is ought to be, therefore P ought to be.”
The moralistic fallacy is the reverse of the naturalistic fallacy. It presumes that what ought to be preferable is what is, or what naturally occurs. In other words: what things should be is the way they are. E. C. Moore used the term for the first time in 1957 in “The Moralistic Fallacy.” The structure of the argument is, “P ought to be, therefore P is.”
“There is no evidence that dogs attempt to dominate others or that they don’t. On the contrary, all evidence suggests that dogs (as most animals) use different strategies depending on conditions including costs and benefits. Sometimes they display dominant behavior, other times they display submissive behavior, and yet other times they display some other behavior” Picture by (L’Art Au Poil École).
The line of argumentation of Naturalistic Dog Training is: Dogs naturally attempt to dominate others; therefore, we ought to dominate them. We can transcribe this argument in two ways (argument 1a and 1b):
Argument 1a
(A) If the nature of dogs is to attempt to dominate others, then I ought to train dogs according to their nature. (P⇒Q)
(B) It is the nature of dogs to attempt to dominate others. (P)
Therefore: I ought to train dogs by attempting to dominate them. (Q)
Argument 1b
(A) If dogs dominate others, then it’s right to dominate others. (P⇒Q)
(B) If it’s right to dominate others, then I have to do the same to be right. (Q⇒R)
Therefore: If dogs dominate others, then I have to do the same to be right. (P⇒R)
We cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is.’ Arguments 1a and 1b commit the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ Both arguments seem formally valid, except that they derive a norm from a fact. There is no logical contradiction in stating, “I ought not to train dogs according to their nature.” They are also unsound (the conclusions are not correct) because premises P are not true.
There is no evidence that dogs attempt to dominate others or that they don’t. On the contrary, all evidence suggests that dogs (like most animals) use different strategies depending on conditions, which include costs and benefits. Sometimes they display dominant behavior, other times they display submissive behavior, and other times they display other behavior. Even when particular dogs are more prone to use one strategy rather than another, we are not entitled to conclude that this is the nature of dogs.
Conclusion: whether science proves that dogs display or don’t display dominant behavior has nothing to do with whether or not it is morally right for us to dominate our dogs.
The line of argumentation of Moralistic Dog Training is: We ought not to attempt to dominate our dogs; therefore, dogs do not attempt to dominate us. We can transcribe this argument in two ways (argument 2a and 2b):
Argument 2a
(A) Dominance is bad. (P⇒Q)
(B) Dogs are not bad. (R⇒~Q)
Therefore: Dogs do not dominate. (R⇒~P)
Argument 2b
(A) If [dominance exists], it is . (P⇒Q)
(B) If it is , [dogs don’t do it]. (Q⇒R)
Therefore: if [dominance exists], [dogs don’t do it]. (P⇒R)
We cannot derive ‘is’ from ‘ought.’ Arguments 2a and 2b commit the ‘moralistic fallacy.’ Argument 2a is formally invalid even if the premises were true because the conclusion is not entailed in the premises (it is the same as saying red is a color, blood is not a color, so blood is not red). Argument 2b sounds a bit odd (in this form), but it is the only way I have found of formulating a valid argument from the moralistic trainers’ argument. It is formally valid but it is unsound because it commits the moralistic fallacy: in its second line, it derives a fact from a norm. It assumes that nature doesn’t do wrong (or what is good is natural), but there is no contradiction in assuming the opposite.
Conclusion: the fact we believe it is morally wrong to dominate our dogs does not mean that dogs do not display dominant behavior. We are entitled to hold such a view, but it does not change the fact that dogs display dominant behavior.
4 Social conditioning and emotional load
The choice of word by ethologists to coin the behavior in English, i.e. ‘dominant,’ also contributes to the dispute. Curiously enough, the problem does not exist in German where dominant and submissive behaviors are ‘überlegenes verhalten’ and ‘unterlegenes verhalten.’
All words we use have connotations due to accidental social conditioning and emotional load. A scientist knows he** cannot afford his judgment to be clouded by his own accidental social conditioning or emotions. A defined term means that and only that. It’s not good, not bad, not right, not wrong, and the issue of whether he likes it or not does not even enter the equation. As an individual he may have his own personal opinion and moral viewpoint, but he does not allow them to affect his scientific work. As individuals, we all have our own likes and dislikes because we are constantly being conditioned by our environment. Culture, trends, movements, environments, relationships and moods, all bias our attitudes towards particular terms. Nowadays, for reasons I will leave to historians and sociologists to analyze, the words ‘dominance’ and ‘submission’ have negative connotations for many people. When people, all of whom are subject to social conditioning, fail to distinguish between the scientific meaning of the words and their everyday connotations, they repudiate them, which is understandable.
Conclusion: a class of behavior that animals use to solve conflicts without harming one another is what ethologists call dominant and submissive behavior. This behavior, in the way I describe and define, exists (see above). You may not like the terms or indeed the behaviors, but that doesn’t mean they don’t exist. ‘Red’ is a characteristic of an object that provides particular information to our eyes as a result of the way it reflects or emits light. We can argue (and we do) about the definition of ‘red,’ what is red, what is not, when it becomes orange, but we do not deny that red exists. You may object to the name ‘red’ but objects will continue to reflect or emit light in a particular way that produces what we call red (or whatever we choose to call it). A ‘red flower’ (or a display of ‘dominant behavior’) is not an abstract concept, but a real, detectable thing, whilst the concept of ‘redness’ is an abstract notion, as are the concepts of ‘dominance,’ ‘height,’ ‘weight,’ ‘strength,’ etc…
5 Unclear grammar
Another problem is that we use the word dominance as a noun (an abstract noun in contrast to a concrete noun) when in this case it is (or should be) a ‘disguised adjective.’ Adjectives don’t make sense without nouns (except for adjectival nouns). Dominance is an abstract noun, something that by definition does not exist (otherwise it wouldn’t be abstract), except as an abstract notion of ‘showing dominant behavior’ and as in ‘dominant allele,’ ‘dominant trait,’ ‘dominant ideology,’ ‘dominant eye,’ etc. However, the behavior of alleles, traits, ideologies and eyes, which we call dominant or classify as dominant, exists. For example, the question “Do dogs show dominance towards humans?” uses the abstract noun ‘dominance’ as an adjectival noun instead of the more correct ‘dominant behavior’. This can be confusing for some as it suggests that dominance is an intrinsic quality of the individual, not the behavior. Therefore, I suggest that, in the behavioral sciences, we henceforth drop the adjectival noun and only use the term as an adjective to behavior. This is a very important point and a source of many misunderstandings and misconceptions regarding the character of behavior.
Behavior is dynamic and changeable. An individual displays one behavior at one given moment and another a while later. The popular view maintains the notion of a ‘dominant individual’ as the one that always shows dominant behavior and the ‘submissive individual’ as the one that always shows submissive behavior, which is not true. Dominant and submissive (dominance and submission) are characteristics of behavior, not individuals. Individuals may and do change strategies according to a particular set of conditions, although they may exhibit a preference for one strategy rather than another.
It is the ability to adopt the most beneficial strategy in the prevailing conditions that ultimately sorts the fittest from the less fit—moral strategies included.
Have a great day,
R—
______________
* This is my normative judgment and as such no one can contest it.
** The most correct form would be ‘he/she,’ or ‘he or she,’ but since I find it extremely ugly from a linguistic point of view (my normative judgment) to use this expression repeatedly, I chose to write, ‘he’ though not by any means neglecting the invaluable and indisputable contribution of my female colleagues.
Hewitt, S. E., Macdonald, D. W., & Dugdale, H. L. 2009. Context-dependent linear dominance hierarchies in social groups of European badgers, Meles meles. Animal Behaviour, 77, 161-169.
Hume, D. 1739. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967, edition.
Pinker, S. How the Mind Works. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.
Popper, K. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, UK.
Popper, K. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford University Press.
Rachels, J. 1990. Created From Animals. Oxford University Press.
Rowell, T. E. 1974. The Concept of Social Dominance. Behavioral Biology, 11, 131-154.
Ruse, M. 1986. Taking Darwin seriously: a naturalistic approach to philosophy. Prometheus Books.
Thanks to Anabela Pinto-Poulton (PhD, Biology), Simon Gadbois (PhD, Biology), Stéphane Frevent (PhD, Philosophy), Victor Ross (Graduate Animal Trainer EIC), Parichart Abrantes (MBA), and Anna Holloway (editor) for their suggestions to improve this article. The remaining flaws are mine, not theirs.
Giant Gambian Pouched finds a landmine (photo by Xavier Rossi).
JG is a rat, a Cricetomys gambianus or Giant Gambian Pouched Rat; she is also a Hero Rat, a landmine detector at Apopo in Tanzania. In December 2009, she performed uncharacteristically badly and puzzled everybody as Hero Rats don’t make mistakes. What was the problem with JG? Had she lost it? Had the trainers made a crucial mistake?
Apopo in Morogoro, Tanzania, trains rats to detect landmines and tuberculosis and the little fellows are very good at what they do. In Mozambique, Apopo has so far cleared 2,063,701 square meters of Confirmed Hazardous Areas, with the destruction of 1866 landmines, 783 explosive remnants of war and 12,817 small arms and ammunitions. As for tuberculosis, up until now the rats have analyzed 97,859 samples, second-time screened 44,934 patients, correctly diagnosed 7,662 samples and discovered 2,299 additional cases that were previously missed by the DOTS centers (Direct Observation of Treatment, Short Course Centers in Tanzania). More than 2,500 patients have since been treated for tuberculosis after having been correctly diagnosed by the rats.
In December 2009, I was working full time at Apopo in Morogoro. I wrote their training manual, trained their rat trainers, supervised the training of the animals and analyzed standard operating procedures. At the time of writing, I still do consultancy work for Apopo and instruct new trainers from time to time. Back then, one of my jobs was to analyze and monitor the rats’ daily performance and that’s when I came across the peculiar and puzzling behavior of JG in the LC3 cage.
Problem
LC3 is a cage with 10 sniffing holes in a line and the rats run it 10 times. On average, 21 holes, randomly selected by computer, will contain TNT samples. We train rats in LC3 everyday, recording and statistically analyzing each session. We normally expect the rats to find and indicate the TNT samples with a success rate of 80-85%. Whenever the figures deviate from the expected results, we analyze them and try to pinpoint the problem.
On December 19, we came across a rat in LC3 that did not indicate any positive samples placed from Holes 1 to 6. She only indicated from Holes 7 to 10. In fact, from Hole 1 to 6, Jane Goodall (that’s the rat’s full name) only once bothered to make an indication (which was false, by the way). From Hole 7 to 10, JG indicated 10 times with 9 correct positives, only missing one, but also indicated 11 false positives. Her score was the lowest in LC3 that day and the lowest for any rat for a long time. What was the problem with JG? She seemed fine in all other aspects and seemed to know what she was doing. Why then did she perform so poorly?
Giant Gambian Pouched Rat searching TNT in a line cage (photo by Silvain Piraux).
Analysis of searching strategies
Whenever an animal shows such a behavior pattern, and it appears purposeful rather than emotional, I become suspicious and suspect that there is a rational explanation.
In order to analyze the problem, I constructed simulations of two searching strategies: (1) searching ALL HOLES, and (2) SKIPPING Holes 1 to 5 (I didn’t want to be as radical in my simulation as JG). In addition, I ran simulations with two different sample placement configurations: (1) evenly distributed between the two halves, i.e. two positives in Holes 1 to 5 and two positives in Holes 6 to 10; and (2) unevenly distributed — one positive in the first five holes and two positives in Holes 6 to 10.
In order to run the simulation, I needed to assign values to the different components of the rat’s behavior. I chose values based on averages measured with different rats.
Walking from feeding hole to first hole (back walk) = 3 seconds.
Walking from covered hole to covered hole = 1 second.
Walking from uncovered hole to uncovered hole = 2 seconds.
Analyzing a hole = 2 seconds.
Indicating a positive = 4 seconds.
Walking from last hole to feeding hole = 1 second.
Eating the treat = 4 seconds.
All time variables were converted into energy expenditure in the calculation of energy payoff for the two strategies and the different configurations. Also the distance covered was converted into energy expenditure. The reinforcers (treats) amounted to energy intake. In my simulation I used estimated values for both expenditure and intake. However, we could measure all values accurately and convert all energy figures into kJ.
The results
In terms of energy, (in this simulation I make several assumptions based on reasonable values, e.g. the total energy spent is a function of distance covered and time spent), the results show that when the value of each treat is high (E gain is close to the sum of all treats amounting to the sum of energy spent for searching all holes), it pays off to search all holes (the loss of -5.50 versus -7.88). The higher the energetic value of each treat, the higher the payoff of the ALL HOLES strategy.This is a configuration with four positives (x) and six negatives (0). The results show that neither strategy is significantly better than the other. On average, when sniffing all holes, the rat receives a treat every 31 seconds, while skipping the first five holes will produce a treat every 31.5 seconds. However, there is a notable difference in how quickly the rat gets to the treat depending on which strategy the rat adopts. ALL HOLES produces a treat on average 5.75 seconds after a positive indication. SKIPPING produces a treat 3.5 seconds after a positive indication. This could lead the rat to adopt the SKIPPING strategy, but it’s not an unequivocally convincing argument.
However, when the energetic value of each treat is low, skipping holes will reduce the total loss (damage control), making it a better strategy (-17.88 versus -25.50).
However, if we run a simulation based on an average of three positives per run, with one in the first half and two in the second half (which is closest to what the rat JG was faced with on December 12), we obtain completely different results.This first analysis does not prove conclusively that the SKIPPING strategy is the best. On the contrary, it shows that, all things considered, ALL HOLES will confer more advantages.
The energy advantage is also detectable in this configuration, even when each treat has a high energetic value (a gain of 3.13 versus a loss of -0.75).With this configuration, the strategy of SKIPPING is undoubtedly the best. On average, it produces a reinforcer every 27.5 seconds (versus 28.7 for ALL HOLES) and 2.5 seconds after an indication (versus 5 seconds).
Conclusion
This second simulation proves that JG’s strategy was indeed the most profitable in principle. However, the actual results for JG are completely different from the ones shown above, as they also have to take into account the amount of energy spent indicating false positives (which are expensive).
It is now possible to conclude that the most advantageous strategy is as follows. Whenever the possibilities of producing a reinforcer are evenly distributed, search all holes. It takes more time, but on average you’ll get a reinforcer a bit quicker than if you skip holes. In addition, you either gain energy by searching all holes, or you limit your losses, depending on the energetic value of each reinforcer. Don’t be fooled by the fact you get a treat sooner after your indication when searching all holes then when skipping.
Whenever the possibilities of producing a reinforcer are not evenly distributed, with a bias towards the second half of the line, skip the first half. It doesn’t pay off to even bother searching the first half. By skipping it, you’ll get a lower total number of reinforcers, but you’ll get them quicker than searching all holes and, more importantly, you’ll end up gaining energy instead of losing it.
Finally, avoid making mistakes by indicating false positives. They cost as much as true positives in spent energy, but you don’t gain anything.
An evolutionary explanation
Of course, no rat calculates energetic values and odds for certain behaviors that are reinforced, nor do they run simulations prior to entering a line cage. Rats do not do this in their natural environment either. They search for food using specific patterns of behavior, which have proven to be the most adequate throughout the history and evolution of the species. A certain behavior in certain conditions, depending on temperature, light, humidity, population density, as well as internal conditions such as blood sugar level etc., will produce a slightly better payoff than any other behavior. Behaviors with slightly better payoffs will tend to confer slight advantages in terms of survival and reproduction and they will accumulate and spread within a population; they will spread slowly, for the time factor is unimportant in the evolution of a trait. Eventually, we will come across a population of individuals with what seems an unrivalled ability to make the right decision in circumstances with an amazing number of variables, and it puzzles us because we forget the tremendous role of evolution by natural selection. Those individuals who took the ‘most wrong decisions’ or ‘slightly wrong’ decisions inevitably decreased their chances of survival and reproduction. Those who took ‘mostly right’ or ‘slightly righter’ decisions gained an advantage in the struggle for survival and reproduction and, by reproducing more often or more successfully, they passed their ‘mostly right’ or ‘slightly righter’ decisions genes to their offspring.
This is a process that the theory of behaviorism cannot explain, however useful it is for explaining practical learning in specific situations. In order to explain such seemingly uncharacteristic behaviors, we need to recur to the theory of evolution by natural selection. This behavior is not the result of trial and error with subsequent reinforcers or punishers. It is an innate ability to recognize parameters and behave in face of them. It is an ability that some individuals possess to recognize particular situations and particular elements within those situations, and correlate them with specific behavior. What these elements are, or what this ability exactly amounts to, we do not know; only that it has been perfected throughout centuries and millennia, and innumerable generations that accumulate ‘mostly right’ or ‘slightly righter’ decisions—and that is indeed evolution by means of natural selection.
Natural selection favors behaviors that prolong the life of an animal and increase its chance of reproducing; over time, a particularly advantageous behavior spreads throughout the population. The disposition (genotype) to display a behavior is innate (otherwise the phenotype would not be subject to natural selection and evolution), although it requires maturation and/or reinforcement for the organism to be able to apply it successfully. Behavior is, thus, the product of a combination of innate dispositions and environmental factors. Some behaviors require little conditioning from the environment for the animal to display it while other behaviors requires more.
Behavior is the response of the system or organism to various stimuli, whether internal or external, conscious or subconscious, overt or covert, and voluntary or involuntary.
Behavior does not originate as a deliberate and well-thought strategy to control a stimulus. Initially, all behavior is probably just a reflex, a response following a particular anatomical or physiological reaction. Like all phenotypes, it happens by chance and evolves thereafter.
Pictures illustrating canine social and agonistic behavior. For the classification of the behavior, please see ethogram below. Behavior is dynamic (not static). All interpretations are therefore only approximate and as pictures allow.
An organism can forget a behavior if it does not have the opportunity to display it for a period of a certain length, or the behavior can be extinguished if it is not reinforced for a period.
Evolution favors a systematic bias, which moves behavior away from maximization of utility and towards maximization of fitness.
Social behavior is behavior involving more than one individual with the primary function of establishing, maintaining, or changing a relationship between individuals, or in a group (society).
Most researchers define social behavior as the behavior shown by members of the same species in a given interaction. This excludes behavior such as predation, which involves members of different species. On the other hand, it seems to allow for the inclusion of everything else such as communication behavior, parental behavior, sexual behavior, and even agonistic behavior.
Sociologists insist that behavior is an activity devoid of social meaning or social context, in contrast to social behavior, which has both. However, this definition does not help us much because all above mentioned behaviors do have a social meaning and a context unless ‘social’ means ‘involving the whole group’ (society) or ‘a number of its members.’ In that case, we should ask how many individuals are needed in an interaction to classify it as social. Are three enough? If so, then sexual behavior is not social behavior when practiced by two individuals, but becomes social when three or more are involved, which is not unusual in some species. We can use the same line of arguing for communication behavior, parental behavior, and agonistic behavior. It involves more than one individual and it affects the group (society), the smallest possible consisting of two individuals.
Agonistic behavior includes all forms of intraspecific behavior related to aggression, fear, threat, fight or flight, or interspecific when competing for resources. It explicitly includes behaviors such as dominant behavior, submissive behavior, flight, pacifying, and conciliation, which are functionally and physiologically interrelated with aggressive behavior, yet fall outside the narrow definition of aggressive behavior. It excludes predatory behavior.
Dominant behavior is a quantitative and quantifiable behavior displayed by an individual with the function of gaining or maintaining temporary access to a particular resource on a particular occasion, versus a particular opponent, without either party incurring injury. If any of the parties incur injury, then the behavior is aggressive and not dominant. Its quantitative characteristics range from slightly self-confident to overtly assertive.
Dominant behavior is situational, individual and resource related. One individual displaying dominant behavior in one specific situation does not necessarily show it on another occasion toward another individual, or toward the same individual in another situation.
Dominant behavior is particularly important for social animals that need to cohabit and cooperate to survive. Therefore, a social strategy evolved with the function of dealing with competition among mates, which caused the least disadvantages.
Aggressive behavior is behavior directed toward the elimination of competition while dominance, or social-aggressiveness, is behavior directed toward the elimination of competition from a mate.
Fearful behavior is behavior directed toward the elimination of an incoming threat.
Submissive behavior, or social-fear, is behavior directed toward the elimination of a social-threat from a mate, i.e. losing temporary access to a resource without incurring injury.
Resources are what an organism perceives as life necessities, e.g. food, mating partner, or a patch of territory. What an animal perceives to be its resources depends on both the species and the individual; it is the result of evolutionary processes and the history of the individual.
Mates are two or more animals that live closely together and depend on one another for survival.
Aliens are two or more animals that do not live close together and do not depend on one another for survival.
A threat is everything that may harm, inflict pain or injury, or decrease an individual’s chance of survival. A social-threat is everything that may cause the temporary loss of a resource and may cause submissive behavior or flight, without the submissive individual incurring injury. Animals show submissive behavior by means of various signals, visual, auditory, olfactory and/or tactile.
Canine ethogram covering social and agonistic behavior.
The diagram does not include a complete list of behaviors.
As always, have a great day!
R—
PS—I apologize if by chance I’ve used one of your pictures without giving you due credit. If this is the case, please e-mail me your name and picture info and I’ll rectify that right away.
Lockwood, R. (1979) Dominance in wolves–useful construct or bad habit.In The Behavior and Ecology of Wolves. Edited by E. Klinghammer. Garland Press: 1st ed.
This paper challenges the prevailing confusion and debate around the concept of dominance in dogs and other social animals, elucidating dominance from an ethological and evolutionary perspective. It argues that dominance is an observable, behavioral characteristic shared across species, not merely a human-imposed social construct. It defines dominance and submission as dynamic, situational behaviors aimed at gaining or temporarily maintaining access to resources without injury, distinct from aggression. Hierarchies, where they exist, are Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) that arise from individuals’ dominant or submissive behavior, adapted to the context. The paper emphasizes the importance of accurate, pragmatic definitions to avoid misunderstandings and advocates for viewing relationships—e.g., human-dog ones—as partnerships built on cooperation rather than rigid hierarchies. Dominance behavior, properly understood, is instrumental in resolving social conflicts and maintaining group stability, rather than being a fixed rank or power status. The paper calls for clear, science-based reasoning rather than emotional or ideological dismissals of dominance.
A relationship is a natural thing! (Photo by Monty Sloan)
Introduction
Stable and profitable relationships are not built in the long run through a series of dominant and submissive displays. Instead, these behaviors are necessary for resolving inevitable social conflict. Both humans and dogs (and wolves, of course) form relationships based on the need for partnership in overcoming common problems related to survival and, preferably, achieving an acceptable level of comfort. Relationships are not founded on hierarchies; however, hierarchies do exist and play a significant role in certain circumstances—for humans as well as dogs (and wolves, of course)—sometimes more, sometimes less, and sometimes not at all (Schenckel, 1947; Zimen, 1976; Mech, 1999; Chase et al., 2002).
Illustration showing the possible combinations of aggressive, fearful, dominant, and submissive behavior in social canines (From “Dog Language” by Roger Abrantes, illustration by Alice Rasmussen). Copyrighted illustration.
In everyday language, dominance refers to having “power and influence over others.” It means supremacy, superiority, ascendancy, preeminence, predominance, mastery, power, authority, rule, command, and control (Cambridge Dictionary; Merriam-Webster). The term has so many meanings and connotations that we cannot simply pick a dictionary definition and employ it as a scientific term in the behavioral sciences. We need to define terms accurately to avoid misunderstandings, meaningless discussions, and nonsensical claims. Unfortunately, the scientists who use the term dominance and its derivatives (as well as those who reject it) have not satisfactorily defined it, thereby contributing to the current confusion about the nature and function of dominant behavior (Drews, 1993).
I intend to remedy this by:
(1) demonstrating that dominance is an observable characteristic of behavior, not a trait of an individual;
(2) establishing that it refers to one and the same class of behaviors independent of species;
(3) presenting a precise, pragmatic, and verifiable definition of the term, which is compatible with evolutionary theory and our body of biological knowledge;
(4) arguing that, even though it is true that a good (in terms of being profitable and stable) relationship does not rely on continuous displays of dominance/submission from the same individuals toward the same other individuals, that does not imply that dogs cannot show dominant behavior.
Denying that dominant behavior exists in dogs has become a popular argument to defend the claim that we must not ‘dominate’ our dogs.
Indeed, the discussion on dominance has run away with us. There is only one thing more absurd and futile than attempting to prove that dominant behavior exists, and that is trying to prove that it does not. In the following, I shall commit the first of these futile acts.
In a stable pack, wolves mostly display dominant and submissive behavior and seldom aggressive and fearful behavior (photo by Monty Sloan).
On the similarities and differences of species
It is absurd to argue that dominance (as an attribute or property) does not exist when we have so many words for it, varying by context and nuance. If it didn’t exist, neither would all these terms (Wittgenstein, 1953; Millikan, 1984; Saussure, 2011). The numerous synonyms and connotations suggest that while the term is difficult to define, we have recognized a behavioral property whose characteristics are distinct enough from others to warrant classification in a specific category and a name. Whether the chosen names are suitable or well-defined is a separate issue and does not affect the behavior itself. We can argue that this attribute (dominance) has been observed and that (1) it only applies to certain human relationships, or that (2) it applies to certain relationships among humans as well as some other animal species. The second option seems more appealing, given that it is unlikely that a specific condition exists in only one species. That would contradict everything we know about the relatedness and evolution of species (Darwin, 1871; Mayr, 1982).
However, there is nothing implausible about stating that the term does not apply to the behavior of a particular species. On the contrary, two species that diverged from a common ancestor billions of years ago evolve and develop their own characteristics, ultimately differing from one another and from their common ancestor. By the same token, closely related species, which diverged from a single common ancestor a few thousand years ago, will exhibit various characteristics similar to or equal to those of the common ancestor and to one another. Some species share many common attributes in terms of phenotype, genotype, and behavior (which is a phenotype); others share fewer, and some none at all. It all depends on their shared ancestry and their adaptation to the environment (Dobzhansky, 1973; Futuyma, 1998).
Wolf-dog hybrid (Image via Wikipedia).
Humans and chimpanzees (Homo sapiens and Pan troglodytes) diverged from a common ancestor about six to seven million years ago (maybe up to 13), so we can expect them to have fewer common attributes than wolves and dogs (Canis lupus lupusand Canis lupus familiaris), which only diverged from a common ancestor about 15 to 20 thousand years ago and definitely no more than 100 thousand years ago according to recent studies (Vilà et al., 1997; Savoilanen et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 2005)
The DNA of humans and chimpanzees differs more than that of wolves and dogs (which is almost identical except for a few mutations). Humans cannot interbreed with chimpanzees (Disotell, 2006; Presgraves & Yi, 2009); wolves and dogs can interbreed and produce fertile offspring. Thus, humans and chimpanzees are two entirely distinct species, whereas wolves and dogs are two subspecies of the same species (Wayne & Ostrander, 1999; Nowak, 2003).
Considering these facts, we can expect wolves and dogs to share a significant number of similarities, which indeed they do, not only physically but also behaviorally—and any layman would attest to that. Their similarities at certain levels enable them to mate, produce fertile offspring, and communicate effectively (Zimen 1981). Nobody questions that wolves and dogs share an extensive repertoire of communication behaviors, and rightly so, as multiple observations have confirmed that they communicate well (Feddersen-Petersen, 2004). Their facial expressions and bodily postures are remarkably similar. Dogs (most breeds) and wolves share similar facial musculature, although domestication has produced some structural differences in dogs that facilitate communication with humans (Coppinger & Coppinger, 2001), and dogs appear to have some limitations in producing the same range of affective facial expressions as wolves (Miklósi et al., 1998). However, these are relatively minor differences between the two subspecies, significantly smaller than the cultural differences observed among humans from geographically separated settlements.
If wolves and dogs can communicate, it suggests that the fundamental elements of their languages must be the same or very similar. That indicates that, despite evolving in seemingly different environments, they have preserved the essential aspects of their genotypic characteristics. There could be several reasons for this: (1) the common genotypes are vital to the organism, (2) the environments were not so crucially distinct after all, (3) evolution needs more time and more selective conditions (since it acts on phenotypes) for the genotypes to begin to differ radically.
Point (1) above means that there are more ways not to be alive than there are ways to be alive. In other words, evolution needs time to come up with different, viable life forms (Darwin, 1859; Mayr, 1963; Futuyma, 1998). Point (2) indicates that although wolves and (pet) dogs currently live in entirely different environments, the phenomenon is still too recent. It is only in the last century that dogs have become so over-domesticated. Before that, they were our companions, domestic animals that retained a considerable degree of freedom and relied (mainly) on the same successful selective factors as always. They were still not pets, and breeding was not predominantly controlled by human selection. Point (3) suggests that, given enough time—a million years or so—we may eventually have two entirely distinct species: wolves and dogs. By then, they will not mate, will not produce fertile offspring, and may exhibit completely different characteristics. Then, we may even change the domestic dog’s scientific name from Canis lupus familiaris to Canis civicus, or Canis homunculus. However, we are not there yet!
On similarities and differences
Recent trends suggest that “dominant behavior” does not exist in dogs (please check the internet), which poses some serious problems. There are two ways to argue in favor of this line of thinking. The first is to dismiss “dominant behavior” outright, which is absurd, as, for the aforementioned reasons, the term does exist, we have a rough understanding of what it means, and we use it in conversation. It must, therefore, refer to a class of behaviors that we have observed (Wittgenstein, 1953; Millikan, 1984; Saussure, 2011). The second way of arguing is to claim that wolves and dogs are entirely different and, therefore, even though we can apply the term to describe wolf behavior, we cannot use it to describe dog behavior. If they were completely different, the argument could be valid, but they are not, as we have seen. On the contrary, they are very similar, and, therefore, this argument is invalid (Copi, 1999).
A third alternative is to propose a brand new theory to explain how two such closely related species, as the wolf and the dog (actually a subspecies), can have developed in such a short period (thousands of years) with so many radically different characteristics in one single aspect, but not in others. This would amount to a massive revision of our entire body of biological knowledge, with implications far beyond wolves and dogs—an alternative I find unrealistic (Bromham, 2009).
That said, when comparing different species’ behavioral strategies, including social structures, we must be careful not to blindly extrapolate across species without regard for the particular ecology and evolution of each species. Comparing involves finding similarities and differences. For example, wolf societies, although similar to stray and feral dog societies in many respects, also (as expected) differ radically in others. Even within the same subspecies—wolves and dogs, respectively—societies vary slightly depending on ecological factors, such as the age of their members, pack size, and prey availability (Zimen, 1976 and 1982; Abrantes, 1997; Mech, 1999; Cafazzo et al., 2010).
Appeal to consequences
A far more appealing approach, it seems to me, is to analyze the concepts we use and define them properly. This would allow us to use them meaningfully when dealing with different species without running into incompatibilities with the entire body of science.
An accurate definition of “dominant behavior” is important because the behavior it describes is crucial to the survival of a particular type of individual, as we shall see.
Dismissing the existence of facts that underlie a term simply because that term is ill-defined or politically incorrect—meaning it doesn’t serve our immediate goals—seems to me to be a flawed approach. That is known as the appeal to consequences fallacy (argumentum ad consequentiam) and represents an error in reasoning (Copi 1999). Dominant behavior exists, but it is poorly defined (if defined at all). Most discussions involving dominant behavior are meaningless because neither party knows precisely what the other is referring to. However, we don’t need to throw the baby out with the bath water!
Definitions
Therefore, I propose that we establish precise definitions of dominant behavior and identify and define the factors necessary to understand what it is, what it is not, how it evolved, and how it functions. Thus:
Dominant behavior (or dominantness) is quantitative and quantifiable behavior displayed by an individual with the function of gaining or maintaining temporary access to a particular resource on a particular occasion, versus a particular opponent, without either party incurring injury. If any party is injured, the behavior is aggressive, not dominant. Its quantitative characteristics range from slightly self-confident to overtly assertive.
Dominant behavior is situational, individual, and resource-related. One individual displaying dominant behavior in a specific situation does not necessarily exhibit it on another occasion, either toward another individual or toward the same individual in a different situation.
Resources are what an organism considers to be life necessities, e.g., food, a mating partner, or a patch of territory. The perception of what an animal finds a resource is both species- and individual-related.
Aggressiveness (aggressive behavior) is behavior directed toward eliminating competition, while dominance (social aggressiveness) is behavior directed toward eliminating competition from a mate.
Mates are two or more animals that live closely together and depend on one another for survival. Aliens are two or more animals that do not live closely together and do not depend on one another for survival. Please note that I’m using the term ‘mate’ as it is commonly used in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, without any sexual connotations.
Dominant behavior is particularly important for social animals that need to cohabit and cooperate to survive. Therefore, a particular social strategy evolved with the function of dealing with competition among mates, whilst conferring the greatest benefit at the least cost (Abrantes, 1997).
Animals display dominant behavior through various signals: visual, auditory, olfactory, and/or tactile.
While fearfulness (fearful behavior) is behavior directed toward the elimination of an incoming threat, submissiveness (submissive behavior), or social-fearfulness, is behavior directed toward the elimination of a social threat from a mate, i.e., losing temporary access to a resource without incurring injury.
A threat is a stimulus that most often precedes a behavior that may harm, inflict pain or injury, or decrease an individual’s chance of survival. A social threat is a threat (a threatening behavior) from another individual or group of individuals that may cause submissive behavior or flight, resulting in the temporary loss of a resource, but not injury.
Animals show submissive behavior through various signals: visual, auditory, olfactory, and/or tactile.
Dynamics of Behavior and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
Persistent dominant or submissive behavior from the same individuals toward the same other individuals may or may not result in a temporary hierarchy of a particular configuration, depending on species, social organization, and environmental circumstances. In stable groups confined to a defined territory, temporary hierarchies will develop more readily. In unstable groups under changing environmental conditions or in undefined or non-established territories, hierarchies will not develop. Hierarchies, or rather the strategies involved, are Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS), which are always slightly unstable, swinging forth and back around an optimal value, depending on the number of individuals in the group and the strategy each individual adopts at any given time (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Hines, 1987). Hierarchies are not necessarily linear, although in small groups and over time, non-linear hierarchies tend to become more linear (Noë et al., 1980; Chase et al., 2002).
Some individuals have a stronger tendency to exhibit dominant behavior, while others tend to show submissive behavior. That may depend on their genetic makeup, early learning, maturity, experiences, etc. There is no single factor that determines this; rather, it is a complex interplay of factors. Let us call this a natural tendency; this is not to say it is not modifiable. It is a fact that some individuals are more assertive than others, while others are less so. Neither is ‘good’ nor bad’ in a moral sense, simply more or less advantageous, depending on context. It is all a question of costs and benefits (Real, 1991; Krebs & Davies, 1993). In one-to-one encounters, all things being equal, individuals are more likely to adopt the strategy they feel most comfortable with, thereby maintaining their history of predominantly displaying either dominant or submissive behavior.
In larger groups, individuals tend to play roles that they feel most comfortable with. However, this can change due to the accidental makeup of the group. Imagine a group with a large proportion of individuals that are prone to showing submissive rather than dominant behavior, and with only a few members showing the opposite tendency. In this scenario, an individual with a tendency to primarily exhibit submissive behavior would be more likely to gain access to resources by adopting more dominant behavior. Success breeds success, and progressively, this individual, who tends to display submissive behavior, increasingly opts for a dominant strategy. If the scenario prompts one individual to change its preferred strategy, then others will also have the same opportunities. The number of individuals exhibiting dominant behavior will increase, but only to a point, as the group cannot sustain too many individuals adopting a dominant strategy. To avoid the risk of injury, it will eventually be more advantageous to adopt or revert to a submissive strategy, depending on the incurred benefits and costs (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Houston & McNamara, 1991; McNamara et al., 1991).
Therefore, the number of dominant and submissive individuals in a group (i.e., individuals adopting one of the two strategies as their preferred strategy) depends not only on individuals’ natural tendencies but also on the proportions of behavioral strategies within the group. Whether it pays off to play a dominant or a submissive role is ultimately a function of benefits and costs, as well as the number of individuals who adopt one particular strategy.
Understanding the relationship between dominant and submissive behavior as an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy) opens up exciting perspectives and could help explain the behavior adopted by any given individual at any given time. An individual will learn to display submissive behavior toward those who act more dominantly and display dominant behavior toward those who act more submissively. That means that no individual always behaves dominantly or submissively as a principle; instead, it all depends on the opponent’s choice of strategy and, of course, the value of the potential benefits and estimated costs (Maynard Smith, 1982; Gross, 1996; Dugatkin & Reeve, 1998).
As a corollary, hierarchies (when they exist) will always be slightly unstable, depending on the strategies adopted by individuals in the group; and will not be linear, except in small groups or subgroups (Chase, 2002).
In the opinion of this author, the mistake we have committed hitherto has been to regard dominance and submission (or, more correctly, dominantness and submissiveness) as more or less static. We haven’t taken into account that these behavioral characteristics, like all phenotypes, are constantly under the scrutiny and pressure of natural selection. They are adaptive, highly variable, and highly quantitative and quantifiable (Fisher, 1930; Lande, 1976; Roff, 1997)
As such, dominance and submission are dynamic features that depend on various variables, a view that is compatible with the ontogeny of behavior at the individual level, including the interaction of genetic predispositions and environmental factors, learning processes, adaptations, and, not least, the broader framework of evolutionary theory.
Dominance and submission are beautiful mechanisms from an evolutionary perspective. They enable (social) animals to live together and survive until they reproduce and pass their (dominant and submissive behavior) genes to the next generation. Without these mechanisms, we wouldn’t have social animals such as humans, chimpanzees, wolves, and dogs, among others.
Suppose an animal resolved all inter-group conflicts with aggressive and fearful behavior. It would be exhausted when subsequently compelled to find food, a mating partner, or a safe place to rest or take care of its progeny (all of which decrease the chances of its own survival and that of its genes). Thus, the alien and mate strategy originated and evolved (see my definitions above). It is impossible to fight everybody all of the time, so a mate is confronted using energy-saving procedures.
Submissive and dominant behavior also control population density, since they rely on individual recognition. The number of individuals an animal can recognize is limited by constraints on brain size and information-processing capacity (Dunbar, 1998; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). If this number exceeds a certain level, recognition becomes inefficient and hinders the alien/mate strategy; fearful/aggressive displays then replace submissive/dominant behavior.
The strategy of submission is sound. Instead of vainly engaging in a desperate fight, waiting may prove more rewarding. By employing pacifying and submissive behavior strategies, subordinates often shadow dominantly behaving animals and gain access to vital resources. By exhibiting submissive behavior, they retain their membership in the group, which also confers them several advantages—particularly defense against rivals.
Hierarchies
Hierarchies work because a subordinate will often move away, showing typical pacifying behavior, without too obvious signs of fear. Thus, the higher-ranking animal may displace a lower-ranking animal when feeding or at a desirable site. Hierarchies in nature are often subtle, making them difficult for an observer to decipher. The reason for this subtlety is the raison d’être of the dominance-submission strategy itself: the lower-ranking animal (adopting the submissive strategy) generally avoids conflicts, and the higher-ranking (adopting the dominance strategy) is not too keen on running into skirmishes either.
Fighting involves a certain amount of risk and can lead to serious injury or even death. Evolution, therefore, tends to favor the development of mechanisms that restrain the intensity of aggressive behavior. Most species exhibit clear signals indicating acceptance of defeat and an end to combat before injury occurs (Matsumura & Hayden, 2006; Natarajan & Caramaschi, 2010).
Sign stimuli, a venerable ethology term, designate specific stimuli that trigger instinctive behavior sequences (Tinbergen, 1951 and 1952). For infants, recognizing these sign stimuli is crucial for their survival immediately after birth. After mastering these essential life-saving responses, the most relevant lesson a social youngster learns is compromise. This skill is vital to maintaining a group’s cohesion and fitness. Natural selection has proven this, favoring those individuals who develop the particular behaviors that enable them to stay together when necessary for their survival and reproduction. In contrast, solitary predators, for example, need no such social traits as they have evolved alternative strategies to ensure their survival and reproduction.
Learning to be social
Learning to be social involves mastering the art of compromise. Social animals spend significant amounts of time together, making conflicts inevitable. It is therefore crucial for them to develop efficient mechanisms to manage hostilities. Limiting aggressive and fearful behavior through inhibition and ritualization is only partially efficient (and safe). For highly social, potentially aggressive animals, it is crucial to have more advanced mechanisms in place to prevent injury. Inhibited aggression is still a form of aggression—it’s like playing with fire on a windy day. It works reasonably well for less social or less potentially aggressive animals. However, animals that are both highly social and potentially highly aggressive need better strategies to ensure that the benefits of group living outweigh its costs (Alexander, 1974; Wilson, 1975; Creel & Creel, 1995).
In the long run, relying on aggression and fear to constantly address trivial problems would become too dangerous and exhausting. Animals exhibit signs of pathological stress when they face persistent threats or are repeatedly forced to attack others. That suggests that social predators require mechanisms beyond mere aggressiveness and fearfulness to resolve social animosities. I suggest that, through the ontogeny of aggressiveness and fearfulness, social animals have also developed two other equally important social behaviors. If the function of aggression is to convey “go away, drop dead, never bother me again,” then the function of social-aggression is to communicate “go away, but not too far, or for too long.” Similarly, social fear expresses “I won’t bother you if you don’t hurt me,” whereas existential fear leaves no room for compromise—“It’s either you or me.”
The key difference between the two types of aggressive behavior lies in their functions. Aggressiveness is directed toward an alien, whereas social aggressiveness is directed toward a mate. Conversely, fearfulness and social fearfulness pertain to the alien and the mate. These are qualitative distinctions that justify the coining of new terms, hence dominance (dominantness) and submission (submissiveness).
What implications does all this have on how we understand and connect with our dogs?
We, as all highly social animals, display dominant behavior (i.e., self-confident, assertive, firm, forceful) as well as submissive behavior (i.e., insecure, accepting, consenting, yielding) depending on many factors including our state of mind, social position, available resources, health status, and the presence of a particular opponent—humans as well as dogs (and wolves, of course). There’s nothing inherently wrong with exhibiting either behavior, except when we display dominant behavior where it would be more beneficial to show submissive behavior, or the other way around. Sometimes we may act more dominantly or submissively, and other times, less so. Our tendencies to act dominantly or submissively vary widely, influenced by numerous factors, since these behaviors are highly quantitative and quantifiable. There is no single, universally correct strategy. Like all Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS), the appropriate behavioral strategy depends on the costs and benefits incurred and on the strategies adopted by others. One strategy cannot exist without the alternative(s). Each strategy keeps the others honest (Maynard Smith, 1982).
Stable and profitable relationships do not develop in the long run through a series of dominant and submissive displays. Instead, these behaviors are necessary for resolving inevitable social conflict. Both humans and dogs (and wolves, of course) form relationships out of a need for partnership in overcoming shared problems related to survival and, preferably, achieving an acceptable level of comfort. Relationships are not necessarily built on hierarchies, but hierarchies do exist and they play a crucial role in certain circumstances—for humans as well as dogs (and wolves, of course)—sometimes more, sometimes less, and sometimes not at all (Chase et al., 2002).
Epilogue (a kind of)
We establish a positive relationship with our dogs based on partnership. Our dogs provide us with a sense of accomplishment we often can’t find elsewhere. In return, they rely on us for essential needs such as food, protection, healthcare, a safe environment, and companionship, as they are social animals. It’s too hard to be a little dog all alone out there in the big world! Sometimes, in this relationship, one of the parties resorts to dominant or submissive behavior, and there’s nothing wrong with that, as long as they do not both show the same behavior at the same time. If both resort to the same behavior, they have a problem: they either run into a conflict that they will usually resolve without injury (the beauty of the dynamics of dominance and submission), or one of them will have to get their act together and find their bearings for both.
A good relationship with our dogs does not involve any mysterious mechanisms. It’s basically the same as in all good relationships, whilst taking into account the particular characteristics of the species and individuals involved. We need no new terms. We need no new theories to explain it. We aren’t, after all, that special, nor are our dogs. We are all made from the same fundamental components: phosphate, deoxyribose, and four nitrogen bases (A, T, G, C) (Alberts et al., 2002).
All we need are clear definitions and a more rational, less emotional approach. Use your heart to enjoy life with other living beings (including your dog), and your reason to explain it (if you need to)—not the other way around. If you don’t like my definitions, feel free to propose better ones (with more advantages and fewer disadvantages), but don’t waste your time, or anyone else’s, on meaningless discussions and knee-jerk reactions. Life is precious, and like with a tasty cake, every moment you waste is like one bite of that yummy cake that you’ve devoured without even realizing it.
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Thanks to Simon Gadbois (merci), Tilde Detz (tak), Victor Ros (gracias), Sue McCabe (go raibh math agate), Parichart Abrantes (ขอบคุณครับ), and Anna Holloway (thank you) for conversations, exchange of messages, and suggestions to improve this paper. Any remaining flaws are mine, not theirs.
Note from the author: In September 2025, I have edited a few paragraphs to correct typos and improve clarity and conciseness.
The conundrum of the behavioral sciences is that they are not exact sciences in the same sense as physics or mathematics. Behavior is like the spectrum of light: it is as difficult to say when yellow turns into orange as when one behavior turns into another. It is a continuum of quantity, perceptible throughout its duration, describable only when quantity turns into quality.
Friendly, insecure, pacifying, submissive, and fearful behaviors are a continuum of quantity, as are content, self-confident, assertive, dominant, and aggressive behaviors. The distinction between any two behaviors is a matter of function; the borderline separating one category from the next is a matter of observational skill, contextual parameters, and convention; the way we understand it all is a matter of definition.
Our brain likes to tidy up information into neat little boxes, but once in a while, I enjoy turning them upside down. It’s good mental exercise, and it helps me maintain a clear sense of perspective.
Roger Abrantes 