Can Two Training Methods Be Equally Good?

treat training dog cartoon

I receive many emails with questions about animal behavior. Most of them involve practical issues, but, now and then, someone poses a more complex question. Here is my answer to one of the latter, one I’d like to share with you because it addresses crucial issues in our understanding of animal behavior and training.

Dear ….,

Thanks for your comment, which allows me to clarify a few issues. By no means do I see animals as biological robots, nor do I regard the Skinnerian approach as the truth, the only truth, and nothing but the truth; quite the contrary. Please consider the following passages from “Mission SMAF—Bringing Scientific Precision Into Animal Training”.

“In fact, I suspect that [communication] even involves more than what science can describe with the intrinsic limitations of its key concepts and methods, no matter how stringent they are.

It seems to me, therefore, that our goal must not be to oppress or suppress emotions, but rather control them and use them advantageously. Emotional arousal proves to be necessary to learn and the right amount of emotional arousal even shows to increase the efficiency of learning processes.”

A very non-Skinnerian statement, I would say.

As to my own method to analyze learning processes in artificial set-ups (like in animal training), I write: “In a crude sense, SMAF is an oversimplification of complex processes […] certainly not an attempt to reduce complex mechanisms to a few formulas. In the end, [its] value depends solely on its successful application to solving practical problems; beyond that, it has no value.”

Operant conditioning (when we use it correctly) is an efficient model of behavior for animal training because we control the conditionals to some extent (as Pavlov explains in his original writings, not the subsequent translations). Whilst operant conditioning is adequate for analyzing behavior at a particular level, beyond that, it becomes too crude an instrument. To understand behavior in a broader sense, we must turn to evolutionary models and concepts—variation, selection, adaptation, fitness, function, evolutionary strategies, ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy), costs and benefits, and so forth. My approach to behavior is therefore a classical ethological one, in the tradition of von Frisch, Lorenz, and Tinbergen—firmly grounded in evolutionary biology and in philosophically coherent reasoning.

Greetings,

RAA

 

The core of the argument is reductionism, the view that we can reduce complex processes to the sum of their simpler parts. In a sense, all science is reductionistic. We attempt to explain complex processes with a few notions well organized in little boxes. That is a process that seems to suit our human brain particularly well.

However, we must bear in mind that our interpretations, independently of how good they are, are just our pictures of an elusive reality. They suit our particular umwelten,* but definitely not all of them. They explain parts of it from specific angles so we can make sense of it. Newton and Einstein—the classical example—are (probably) both right, each explaining reality at a different level.

There’s nothing wrong about being a reductionist if only we do not get greedy and attempt to explain far too much with far too little, as in, “That’s it, this is the way things are. Period.” Simplifying often gets us to the point that complicating and oversimplifying have both missed.

In animal training, one theory or method can be as good as another depending on its foundations, approaches, what it attempts to explain, and the practical goals it aims to serve. If both are based on reliable evidence, use well-defined terms, and are logically sound, there’s little to choose between one or the other.

If only animal trainers understood that, I believe we would forgo many senseless disputes. Then again, we can brag about being the most emotional creatures on this big blue marble of ours, can’t we?

___________

* Umwelt (plural umwelten) in ethology means the world as it is experienced by a particular organism.

___________

References

Abrantes, R. (2018). Mission SMAF—Bringing Scientific Precision In to Animal Training. Wanka Tanka Pub.

Lorenz, K. (1937). Über die Bildung des Instinktbegriffes. Naturwissenschaften, 25, 289–300. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01492648

Павлов, И. П. (1926). Двадцатилетний опыт объективного изучения высшей нервной деятельности (поведения) животных. Ленинград: Научное химико-техническое издательство. (Pavlov, I. P. (1926). Twenty Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behavior) of Animals. Leningrad: Scientific Chemical-Technical Publishing House.)

Skinner, B. F. (1938). The Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Uexküll, J. von. (1934). Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. Berlin: Julius Springer. (English translation: A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With A Theory of Meaning, translated by Joseph D. O’Neil, University of Minnesota Press, 2010.)

I Do Enjoy Being Kind to Other Animals

(First published April 13, 2014, edited February 26, 2018)

 

I Do Enjoy Being Kind to Other Animals

I do enjoy being kind to animals, other than humans—and I don’t need a rational justification as to why that feels right for me. I respect them for what they are and interact with them on equal terms. I don’t believe it is right to subjugate them to my will, to control them, to change them.

Yes, I do enjoy being kind to animals, as it brings a sense of harmony to my life. While I can’t force anyone to choose harmony or define it in a specific way, I can demonstrate how bullying does not lead to stability. Because of this, I find it difficult to argue with people who believe that bullying others—whether human or non-human—is acceptable. Nor can I argue with people who think it’s justifiable to hurt others in order to achieve their goals since I find such actions objectionable. I cannot discuss with people who deny or affirm a particular matter of fact to justify their moral decisions, because my mind rejects invalid, unsound arguments.

Morality and science are two separate disciplines. I may not like the conclusions and implications of some scientific studies, and I may even find their application to be immoral; yet, my responsibility as a scientist is to report findings objectively. Stating a fact does not oblige me to adopt any particular moral stance. While science does influence my perceptions, it does not dictate how I feel about that fact. Ultimately, my moral decisions are independent of scientific facts.

G. E. Moore coined the term naturalistic fallacy in 1903 in “Principia Ethica.” In 1739, David Hume described, in “A Treatise of Human Nature,” the ‘is-ought problem,’ also called ‘Hume’s Law’ or ‘Hume’s Guillotine.’ The ‘is-ought fallacy’ consists of deriving an ‘ought’ conclusion from an ‘is’ premise. We cannot deduct ‘ought’ from ‘is.’

As an ethologist, my focus is on understading what is, not what ought to be. Echoing Satoshi Kanazawa, if I conclude something that is not supported by evidence, I commit a logical fallacy, which I must correct, and that’s my problem. However, if my conclusion offends your beliefs, then that’s your problem.

With time, the rational principles that govern my mind and the ethical ones that regulate my conduct may or may not prove to be the fittest. Meanwhile, due to genetic pre-programming, social conditioning, and evolutionary biology, I do enjoy being kind to animals. I respect them for what they are and interact with them on equal terms—and I don’t need a rational justification as to why that feels right for me.

Featured image: I do enjoy being kind to other animals, respecting them for what they are and interacting with them on equal terms.

I’m a Citizen of the World

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I’m a citizen of the World,” I say when asked where I come from—and I am, in mind and heart.

Diogenes, in about 412 BC, was probably the first to use the expression and express the very same sentiment. Socrates (469-399 BC) concurred: “I am not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world.” Kaniyan Poongundran, the Tamil poet, wrote (at least 2000 years ago), “To us all towns are one, all men our kin.” Thomas Paine (English-American philosopher, 1737 – 1809), said, “The world is my country, all mankind are my brethren and to do good is my religion.” Albert Einstein (1879-1955) thought of himself as a world citizen, “Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind.”

I’m a citizen of the world. I’ve traveled over most of our beautiful planet, seen mountains above the clouds with perennial snow tops, and oceans reaching far beyond the eye can see. I’ve lived in temperatures from 40ºC below zero to 40ºC above. I’ve eaten all kinds of food prepared by humans and spent many a day and night enjoying the company of people with the most exceptional cultures and habits.

What’s my favorite place? I don’t have one. Everywhere I’ve been, I’ve discovered new pieces in this amazing puzzle of life. Everywhere I’ve been, from the most glamorous cities to the poorest war-torn areas, I’ve met kind and gentle people. I’ve shared water with the Maasai in the African desert and rice with the Chhetris in the Nepalese mountains. With all of them, I felt a strong kinship: no country, no culture, no language, no divide—we were family, we were humans, we were sentient living beings. Yes, I’m a citizen of the world.

Life is great!

 

Featured image: Everywhere I’ve been, I’ve discovered new pieces in this amazing puzzle of life.